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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION TESTING: 
THEORIES OF STANDING AND A REPLY TO 
PROFESSOR YELNOSKY 
Leroy D. Clark* 
In this Article, Professor Clark addresses the legal issues sur-
rounding the use of testers-individuals who deliberately apply for 
employment to detect sex and race discrimination. He surveys three 
theoretical justifications for granting standing to organizations that 
run testing programs. Professor Clark then responds to a previous 
article by Professor Yelnosky, disputing some of his conclusions. 
Professor Clark indicates that testing isjust as necessary in higher-
level employment as lower-level employment; shows that testers can 
obtain meaningful relief from the courts; analyzes the impact of the 
1991 Civil Rights Act amendments; and encourages Congress to 
authorize the EEOC to run tester programs that are exempt from 
laws which prohibit misrepresentation of applicant credentials. 
INTRODUCTION 
April 6, 1987, Nightline: Ted Koppel asks Al Campanis, then 
the general manager of the Los Angeles Dodgers, whether racial 
prejudice accounts for so few Blacks occupying executive posi-
tions in professional baseball. Campanis replies: "No. It's just 
that they may not have some of the necessities to be a field 
manager or general manager."1 
A public uproar followed this awkwardly candid effort to 
"explain" away racial discrimination on the grounds that Blacks 
lacked the business and administrative acumen required for 
front office jobs. Higher-ups in the Dodgers organization apolo-
gized and Mr. Campanis was fired. 2 The event was stunning, 
* Professor of Law, Catholic University, Columbus School of Law. B.A. 1956, 
City College of New York; LL.B. 1961, Columbia University School of Law. I wish to 
acknowledge the excellent research assistance of Ms. Sheryl Miller, a recent graduate 
of the Catholic University Law School. I also benefitted from the careful reading and 
comments of Ms. Claudia Withers, Executive Director of the Fair Employment Council 
of Greater Washington. The views expressed herein, however, should not be deemed 
to be the views of Ms. Withers or of the Fair Employment Council. 
1. Bill Dwyre, Campanis Questions Ability of Blacks, L.A. TlMES, Apr. 7, 1987, 
pt. III, at 1. 
2. Grahame L. Jones, Dodgers Fire Campanis Over Racial Remarks, L.A. TIMES, 
Apr. 9, 1987, pt. I, at 1. 
1 
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not so much because it evidenced a stereotypical undervaluation 
of Blacks' capacity to fill certain jobs, but because the unsophisti-
cated Mr. Campanis did not realize he was giving fairly open 
evidence of those sentiments. 
Indeed, the hallmark ofracial discrimination in employment 
today is its covert, silent, and unnoticed existence. Older 
whites, who either lived in the South or were otherwise knowl-
edgeable about pre-1960s racial discrimination, know that 
American society has changed dramatically: open and ap-
proved signs of racial segregation largely have disappeared. 
Younger whites-under age thirty-have little direct experi-
ence with racial apartheid, and in fact may feel victimized 
when they hear of Blacks benefitting from affirmative action.3 
Most whites do not occupy positions of power that allow them 
to exclude Blacks from employment opportunities, and those 
with such power probably rationalize their racial bias on 
"qualifications" grounds.4 In addition, those with such power, 
unlike Mr. Campanis, generally hide racial animus. Whites 
probably are never told when they have obtained a position for 
which a Black was more qualified. The current invisible 
character of racial discrimination in employment probably 
explains the wide disp~rity in public opinion polls between 
white and Black perceptions of the continued presence of 
racial discrimination in employment. 5 
3. While polls between 1942 and 1956 showed that "younger people were more 
likely than older people to favor [racial] desegregation," A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS 
AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 118 (Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989) 
[hereinafter COMMON DESTINY), Richard Cohen reported a recent poll by the Anti-
Defamation League which showed that the racial attitudes of persons under 30 are 
closer to those of older persons, and in some instances younger persons are more 
intolerant. Richard Cohen, Generation of Bigots, WASH. POST, July 23, 1993, at A23. 
The Anti-Defamation League's poll asked whites whether Blacks prefer to remain on 
welfare rather than work. Of those polled in the 50-year-old and older group, 42% 
responded in the affirmative, as compared with 29% in the 30-49 age group, and 36% 
in the under-30 group. Over 68% of those under age 30 thought that Blacks "complain 
too much about racism." This was a higher percentage than either other age group. 
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, HIGIIl.JGH'IS FROM AN ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE 
SURVEY ON RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA 22-25 (1993). Cohen's editorial added the 
comment that the younger age group is "pathetically ignorant of recent American 
history" and is resentful of affirmative action programs. Cohen, supra. 
4. Black teenagers typically have been unemployed at twice the rate of white 
teenagers. CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE 
UNDERCLASS 124 (1992). Jencks suggests that many employers may believe that they 
are making "efficient" decisions when they avoid hiring young Blacks, particularly 
Black males, because they believe that they would make unruly and unreliable 
employees. Id. at 123. 
5. A 1989 nationwide poll showed that 51 % of whites believed that Blacks are 
not promoted as rapidly as whites to supervisory jobs. A much larger percentage of 
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Yet, the evidence on the macroeconomic level reveals that 
racial discrimination in employment remains prevalent. Since 
1977, the Black unemployment rate has been twice the rate of 
whites.6 Moreover, a college degree has not neutralized the 
disparity in unemployment: Black college graduates have an 
unemployment rate 2.24 times that of white college gradu-
ates.7 This is a greater gap than that between white and Black 
high school graduates.8 Holding constant those factors which 
may explain differences between the races-such as education, 
experience, and other job qualifications-racial minorities are 
overrepresented in lower-level occupations, and often receive 
lower wages than non-minorities performing the same work.9 
Although today ample data demonstrate that racial discrim-
ination endures in employment, the situation was even worse 
prior to the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 10 which barred employment discrimination based on 
race. Upon the adoption of Title VII, some commentators were 
skeptical about its efficacy in eradicating racial discrimination. 
They predicted that determined employers would mask 
discrimination by claiming that the applicant lacked the 
requisite job qualifications and that plaintiffs would not be 
able to prove otherwise. 11 
Blacks (83%), however, believe that Blacks are not promoted as rapidly as whites. 
LOUIS HARRIS & Assoc., NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., THE 
UNFINISHED AGENDA ON RACE IN AMERICA 28 (1989); see also JAMES R. KLUEGEL & ELIOT 
R SMITH, BELIEFS ABOUT INEQUALITY: AMERICANs' VIEWS OF WHAT Is AND WHAT OUGHT TO 
BE 179-213 (Peter H. Rossi et al. eds., 1986) (setting forth results of authors' data 
and analysis, comparing it to other surveys, and attempting to provide a theory to 
explain the disparity in Black and white attitudes in regard to equal opportunity). 
6. ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 
102--03 (1992); cf WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PuBLIC POLICY 42 (1987) (citing differences in Black and white 
employment rates as great as 21.5%). 
7. HACKER, supra note 6, at 104. 
8. Id. 
9. COMMON DESTINY, supra note 3, at 146-47. 
10. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). 
11. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Improving the Economic Status of Negroes Through 
Laws Against Discrimination.: A Reply to Professor Sovern, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 817, 
832-33 (1967). These predictions were not merely unsupported speculations: the 
record of accomplishments under employment discrimination laws in some states was 
poor. See MICHAELT. SoVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOY-
MENT 19~0 (1966); Herbert Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice 
Commissions: A Critical Analysis with Recommendations, 14 BUFF. L. REV. 22, 22-24 
(1964). 
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As experience with Title VII has matured, the courts have 
developed interpretations which help neutralize covert dis-
crimination in hiring, although the present solutions are 
insufficient. For example, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 12 the 
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff can make out a prima 
facie case of a Title VU violation without direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent, when an employment practice unrelated 
to job performance results in a statistically significant pattern 
of exclusion-known as disparate impact-of minorities or 
women.13 Moreover, the Court held in Watson v. Ft. Worth 
Bank & Trust Co. 14 that a prima facie case can be established 
under a disparate impact claim by showing that a pattern of 
employment decisions has been largely subjective.15 These 
cases, as valuable as they are, will not support charges of 
racial discrimination in hiring unless the employer has a work 
force large enough to generate a statistically significant hiring 
pattern. Thus, Griggs and its progeny are not useful with 
regard to small employers-who, as a whole, generate the bulk 
of new jobs in the economy16-but whose work force is too 
small on anindiviqual basis to present the requisite statistical 
profile. 
The Court's analysis in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 11 
provides a useful framework to address hiring discrimination 
by small employers or discrimination against a single individ-
ual. ·Und¢r McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff can establish a 
prima facie case of racial discrimination by alleging that (1) 
she applied for work for which she was qualified; (2) she was 
turned down; and (3) the employer later hired a person of a 
different race or sex.18 Once the plaintiff establishes her prima 
facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to create an issue 
of fact by showing some legitimate reason, not based on race 
or sex, as to why the plaintiff was not hired. The plaintiff 
must rebut the defendant's reason to prevail.19 · 
12. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
13. Id. at 432. 
14. 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
15. Id. at 991. 
16. See Steven Greenhouse, Clinton Plan-Small Businesses Smile, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 28, 1993, § 3, at 1. 
17. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
18. Id. at 802. 
19. Id. at 802-04; see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 
253 (1981) (holding that the plaintiff can prove that th!) defendant's proffered reason 
is a pretext for discrimination). The Court materially increased the plaintiffs burden 
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Even McDonnell Douglas, however, is limited in its useful-
ness because several factors may deter a potential plaintiff 
from ever filing a charge. Specifically, an applicant may not 
know the sequence in which the employer received job appli-
cations; may be reluctant to file a charge without clear infor-
mation that the successful applicant was less qualified; may 
have no method, except by filing a charge, to obtain such 
information; or may want to spend time searching for work 
rather than pursuing a discrimination charge.2° Further, 
applicants may be fearful that an employer against whom they 
lodge a complaint can prejudice their search for work with 
other employers. 21 Lay persons may not know that retaliation 
against a person who makes a charge in good faith is unlaw-
ful,22 or even if knowledgeable, they may not believe that 
authorities can enforce the anti-reprisal provision effectively. 
The problems applicants confront, both in being aware of 
and in being equipped to cope with discrimination, may help 
explain why incumbent employees or those who have been 
discharged currently file many more charges of discrimination 
than those who claim discrimination in hiring.23 Employment 
gives an individual more information about an employer's 
practices and possible discrimination, and also provides an 
incentive to repair a negative employment record. Substantial 
discrimination in hiring may go unremedied, however, because 
employers engage in covert discrimination. 24 
on the pretext issue in St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). In 
Hicks, the Court held that a plaintiff does not necessarily prevail by proving that the 
defendant lied and that his proffered reasons were not the basis for the employment 
action. The plaintiff must go further and convince the fact finder that the defendant's 
action was motivated by discriminatory intent. Id. at 2749. 
20. Michael fix et al., An Overview of Auditing for Discrimination, in CLEAR AND 
CoNVINCING EvlDENCE: MEAsUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA 1, 14 (Michael Fix 
& Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993). 
21. This may constitute more of a problem for professionals, because their 
community of potential employers is relatively small. 
22. It is unlawful for any employer, employment agency, joint labor-management 
committee controlling apprenticeships, or labor union to discriminate against any 
individual "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988). · 
23. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employ-
ment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 984 (1991) ("While most cases 
formerly attacked discrimination in hiring, today the vast majority of all litigation 
suits challenge discrimination in discharge."). Employers who had fairly open 
practices of discrimination prior to the passage of the statute would have been 
natural targets for plaintiffs. 
24. One commentator is so convinced of the inefficacy of attaining non-discri-
mination by litigation with the current tools that he has proposed amendments to 
6 Univeraity of Michigan Journal of Law &form [VOL. 28:1 
The Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington (FEC), 
an organization created in 1990, has instituted a creative 
response to the problem of covert hiring discrimination.25 The 
organization promotes civil rights in general, and equal oppor-
tunity in employment in particular. It has pioneered employ-
ment testing as a new strategy to uncover employment 
discrimination. Generally, the strategy involves sending a pair 
of equally qualified testers to apply for the same job, and then 
observing whether the minority or female applicant receives 
less favorable results than her white or male counterpart.26 
The FEC has had two cases which are useful in considering 
the key legal issue of standing for parties and organizations 
acting as testers of employment discrimination. In Fair Em-
ployment Council v. BMC Marketing Corp.,21 the district court 
found that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, but the appellate 
court, on an interlocutory appeal, reversed in part and affirmed 
in part on the standing issue. In Fair Employment Council v. 
Molovinsky, 28 the FEC was sustained on the standing issue and 
obtained a damage award.29 No interlocutory appeal was taken 
anti-discrimination legislation that would require employers to meet quota hiring or 
pay fines. See David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in 
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619 (1991). But see 
Leroy D. Clark, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment by 
David A Strauss, 79 GEO. L.J. 1695 (1991) (responding to and critiquing Strauss's 
proposal). 
25. I was one of the original incorporators of the organization. The reader will 
have to judge whether that has compromised the objectivity of this Article. 
26. The FEC uniformly trained all testers regarding interview procedures. Each 
tester diligently reported her experience in the application process to a FEC staff 
person. FAIR EMPLOYMENT COUNCIL OF GREATER WASHINGTON' INC., ANNUAL REPORT 
1990-1992, at 4. The FEC found that minority and female applicants received less 
information about available jobs from employers and employment agencies than did 
their white or male counterparts. Id. at 5-6. 
27. 829 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd in part and affd in part, 28 F.3d 1268 
(D.C. Cir. 1994). The case relied on two tests made in December 1990 at employment 
agencies. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1270. In both tests, the white tester received 
a referral while his Black counterpart did not. Id. All testers were male college students 
who presented similar resume credentials. Id. 
28. No. 91-7202 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 1993). 
29. D.C. Jury.Awards $79,000 in Damages inBias Case Using Employment Thsters, 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 155, at A-15 (Aug. 13, 1993) [hereinafter D.C. Jury Awards]. 
In Molovinsky, a woman seeking employment complained to the FEC that she had 
been subjected to sex discrimination by a local employment agency. The FEC then sent 
two female testers to the employment agency, where they were offered a waiver of the 
fee if they submitted to sexual relations with the proprietor. Two male testers were 
only asked to pay a fee for the referral. Interview with Claudia Withers, Executive 
Director, Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc., in Washington, D.C. 
(Feb. 7, 1994) [hereinafter Withers Interview]. 
The two female testers each received $5,000 in compensatory damages, and $10,000 
in punitive damages. The bona fide applicant for employment received $17,000 in 
compensatory damages, and $10,000 in punitive damages. The FEC received $22,000 
in compensatory damages. D.C. Jury Awards, supra. 
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on the standing issue in Molovinsky. 30 
Part I of this Article addresses the question of standing for 
plaintiffs in light of these decisions and current literature on 
the doctrine. Part II comments critically on an article by 
Professor Yelnosky,31 which concluded that private testers do 
not qualify for relief that would justify attorneys' fees and that 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or the 
Commission) currently has no authority to utilize its own 
testers. Part III addresses the need for legislative amendments 
to Title VII. 
I. THE STANDING ISSUE 
The claim that a plaintiff has no standing to bring a lawsuit 
is a very powerful and efficient defense if it is sustained. It 
means either that the court lacks a justiciable issue, or that 
the plaintiff has not alleged legally relevant facts sufficient to 
identify him as a proper party to maintain the suit. The defen-· 
dant can assert this claim immediately after receiving the 
complaint, and if it is sustained, no further proceedings will 
follow. Because in employment discrimination, an organiza-
tion's standing to sue could be crucial in encouraging private 
actions, it will be addressed thoroughly here. 
Scholars have found the Supreme Court's development of the 
law of standing to be unsatisfactory. Commentators appear to 
follow one of three approaches in describing standing doctrine. 
The black-letter law approach accepts the traditional concepts 
used to resolve standing issues, but finds particular decisions 
contradictory, unpalatable, or hard to justify under the stated 
rules.32 The public rights model finds the present strictures on 
30. Withers Interview, supra note 29. 
31. Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover 
and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skille.d, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 403 (1993). Professor Yelnosky and I agree that private parties 
engaged in testing have standing to sue under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 
Our only disagreements are over the right of private parties to attorneys' fees and the 
authority of the EEOC to engage in testing. 
32. See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. 
Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 635 (1985) (criticizing the Burger Court's standing 
decisions as inconsistent, vacillating, and "at best, erratic"); N. Morrison Torrey, 
Indirect Discrimination Under Title VII: Expanding Male Standing to Sue for Injuries 
Received as a Result of Employer Discrimination Against Females, 64 WASH. L. REV. 
365, 369-70 n.20 (1989) (noting that the Supreme Court itself has described standing 
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the doctrine dysfunctional and urges a more liberal statement 
that would open the courts to more plaintiffs and issues.33 
Finally, the functional approach argues that decisions would 
be more coherent and explainable if the courts were asking the 
right question.34 This Article demonstrates that the individual 
testers and their organizational backers have strong bases 
from which to assert their standing to sue under the last two 
approaches, but only an arguable claim under the black-letter 
law approach. 
A. The Black-Letter Law Approach 
Under traditional standing doctrine, two primary consider-
ations require scrutiny. First, Article III of the Constitution 
limits the judiciary to deciding only matters which constitute 
"cases" or "controversies."35 Second, the courts have developed 
prudential principles that attempt to ensure that the party 
who pursues a claim is the one best suited to do so. 36 
doctrine as inconsistent and amorphous); Kurt S. Kusiak, Note, Standing to Sue: A 
BriefReuiew of Current Standing Doctrine, 71 B.U. L. REV. 667, 677 (1991) (claiming 
that the Court "further complicated" standing with the "zone of interest" test 
developed in Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S~ 150, 153 
(1970)); John C. Yang, Chapter, Standing . .. In the Doorway of Justice, 59 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1356, 1358, 1385'.-94 (1991) (criticizing the reconstruction of the "zohe 
of interest" test in Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918 
(D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
33. Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Gouer-
nance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1392-93 (1988); Heidi L. Feldman, Note, Diuided We 
Fall: Associational Standing and Collectiue Interest, 87 MICH. L. REV. 733, 734-35, 
745-55 (1988). 
34. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223, 228-29 
(198S) (arguing that all standing questions should be resolved as questions on the 
merits by looking to the underlying constitutional or statutory provisions). 
35. Article III provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States ... to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party-;to Controversies between 
two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State,-between 
Citizens of different States .... " U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
The Supreme Court has further defined Article III to require a case which is not 
moot, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 315-20 (1974), or a case which is ripe, 
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458, 459 n.10 (1974), or a case which does not 
involve a political question, Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-06 (1979). None 
of these doctrines will be explored further, because they are not relevant to the 
claims explored here. 
36. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985) (stating 
that litigants must assert their own legal interests "rather than those of third 
parties"), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1223 (1988). 
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The Court's primary concern in interpreting Article III is to 
preserve the separation of powers by preventing the courts 
from encroaching on Congress's Article I authority or the 
Executive Branch's Article II powers.37 The courts thus require 
that the plaintiff prove an "injury in fact" which is "fairly 
traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and 
likely to be redressed by the requested relief."38 Even when a 
plaintiff asserts that some "injury in fact" meeting the 
constitutional threshold has occurred, the courts may still 
refuse to take the case under the doctrine of prudential 
limitations.39 The courts have imposed prudential limitations 
on themselves to preserve judicial resources for their most 
important functions.40 It is important to note that this second 
limitation is not based on the Constitution. Accordingly, 
Congress can require the courts to disregard prudential con-
siderations by enacting legislation that grants standing to the 
full extent permitted by Article IIl. 41 
An example makes the significance of prudential limitations 
apparent. Courts prohibit a person from suing to protect the 
rights of another who is not a party to the litigation.42 Thus, 
an organization has standing to sue on its own behalf or in a 
representative capaCity to redress injuries suffered by its 
members. 43 An organization does not gain standing to sue on 
its own behalf merely because it has expended litigation 
resources to enjoin· a ·defendant's practices that impact on 
another party if the organization has no representative 
relationship with that party.44 
37. See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 404 (1989) (holding 
that permitting Article III judges to join certain commissions does not violate 
separation of powers doctrine); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696--97 (1988) 
(ruling, inter alia, that the Spe~ial Division's appointment of an independent counsel 
does not encroach upon Article I). · 
38. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (citations omitted). 
39. See id. at 756, 761. 
40. See id. at 752. 
41. See Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (holding that 
§ 812 of the Fair Housing Act extends standing to the limits of Article III). 
42. See Marc Rohr, Fighting for the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law ofThird-
Party Standing and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393, 394 
(1981) ("The third-party standing rule is clearly not of constitutional magnitude, but 
rather is a judicially self-imposed 'prudential' limitation on the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts, including the Supreme Court."). 
43. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972). 
44. See, e.g., United States v. San Francisco, 979 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that a union may not derive standing from members who have chosen 
separate representation). 
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Given the above exposition of the current black-letter law, 
do both of the plaintiffs-the individual testers and the 
FEC-satisfy the requirements for standing? The formal 
answer can be found in a simple analogy to the Fair Housing 
Act.45 The Court in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman46 held that 
individual plaintiffs and a plaintiff organization, Home 
Opportunities Made Equal (HOME), who were testing for 
racial discrimination had standing to bring suit against real 
estate brokers who allegedly operated in a racially discrimi-
natory manner by supplying false information about the 
availability of housing.47 The Court held that the individual 
minority applicants claimed an injury within the meaning of 
the statute because they claimed they had been denied 
truthful information about housing due to their race.48 
The Court held that HOME had standing to sue on its own 
behalf, apart from the standing it derived from its members, 
because the defendants had disrupted their program of seek-
ing racial integration in housing and the organization had to 
divert resources from finding integrated housing for persons 
to ferreting out arid combatting the defendants' racially dis-
criminatory policies.49 
A conflict has developed between circuits on the proper 
interpretation of the Havens case regarding the nature of the 
injury that an organization must allege to have standing in its 
own right. The appellate court in BMC Marketing Corp. 
interpreted Havens to mean that the FEC did not obtain 
standing because of its testing program. Rather, it held that 
the FEC's only basis for standing was its showing that the 
defendant had engaged in racial discrimination against 
persons who were not testers and that, apart from testing, the 
defendant had "perceptibly impaired" the FEC's programs to 
achieve racial integration in employment. 50 The court thus 
45. Two student works taking this approach have concluded that testers have 
standing to sue. Steven G. Anderson, Comment, Tester Standing Under Title VII: A 
Rose by Any Other Name, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1217, 1219 (1992); Shannon E. Brown, 
Note, Tester Standing Under Title VII, 49WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1117, 1126-27 (1992). 
46. 455 U.S. 363 (1982). 
47. Id. at 373-79. The Federal Fair Housing Act makes it illegal "[t]o represent 
to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin that any dwelling 
is not available ... when such dwelling is in fact so available." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) 
(1988). 
48. Havens, 455 U.S. at 374-75. 
49. Id. at 378-79. 
50. Fair Employment Council v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1277 CD.C. Cir. 
1994). 
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expressly disapproved of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' 
decision in Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 51 which interpreted 
Havens to mean that an organization demonstrated "injury" 
-and thus standing-by showing that it had to deflect time 
and money from some of its activities to achieve racial inte-
gration in housing into a testing program and subsequent 
litigation.52 
Dwivedi may be a better reading of Havens than BMC 
Marketing Corp. BMC Marketing Corp. criticizes Dwivedi by 
questioning the basing of standing on the costs incurred in 
instituting litigation: under such a holding any organization 
could establish standing in its own right merely by virtue of 
bringing a lawsuit. 53 The Dwivedi court's point could be an-
swered by limiting standing. Instead of basing standing on a 
diversion of resources to litigation per se, standing could be 
limited to only those organizations which incur the additional 
costs of hiring and training testers and directing an invest-
igation which uncovers the defendant's discriminatory con-
duct.54 This is "time and money" which otherwise could have 
been spent on the organization's regular counseling program 
-thus frustrating the organization's goals.55 BMC Marketing 
Corp. acknowledges that Havens expressly refers to a "drain 
on the organization's resources," but argues that this was 
"simply another manifestation of the injury that those [illegal] 
practices had inflicted upon 'the organization's noneconomic 
interest in encouraging open housing.' "56 The BMC Marketing 
Corp. court saw the only possible injury to the organization as 
the hindrance to its racial integration program. 
The BMC Marketing Corp. court may have felt compelled to 
reach this outcome because, under the version of Title VII 
which governed the case, a plaintiff could only secure an 
51. 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990). 
52. Id. at 1526. 
53. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1277. 
54. The district court in BMC Mktg. Corp., in line with the standard of the 
Seventh Circuit, found that the FEC had standing because it was forced to expend 
resources to conduct a second test of the defendant to confirm the discriminatory 
result of the first test. 829 F. Supp. 402, 406-07 (D.D.C. 1993). 
55. The appellate court in BMC Mktg. Corp. argued in the alternative that the 
drain on the FEC's resources was not an injury because any loss to its non-tester 
programs was "self-inflicted": the FEC, not BMC Marketing Corp., determined the 
use of resources for testing purposes. 28 F.3d at 1276. Nevertheless, it could just as 
well be argued that the testing was mandated by the defendant's behavior-it was 
the defendant who adopted a covert form of racial discrimination which could be 
uncovered only by the FEC's testing investigation. 
56. 28 F.3d at 1277 (quoting Hauens, 455 U.S. at 379). 
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injunction against prospective racial discrimination.57 Under 
the Fair Housing Act58 involved in Dwivedi and Havens-and 
under the current Title VIl59-a plaintiff could also be 
awarded compensatory damages for his injuries.60 It is clear 
that the Havens court granted the organization standing to 
sue exclusively based on its right to receive money damages 
for injury done to it as an organization: the court expressly 
declined to rule on the standing of the organization via the 
injury to its members, and the request for an injunction had 
been removed. from the case at the request of the plaintiff 
organization.61 Moreover, the court in Havens quoted the 
following from the plaintiff's brief: "Plaintiff HOME has been 
frustrated by defendants' racial steering practices-in its efforts 
to assist equal access to housing through counseling and other 
referral services. Plaintiff HOME has had to devote significant 
resources to identity and counteract the defendant's [sic] 
racially discriminatory steering practices."62 The court then 
said: 
If, as broadly alleged, petitioners' steering practices have 
perceptibly impaired HOME's ability to provide counseling 
and referral services for low- and moderate-income home-
57. Prior to 1991, plaintiffs were limited under Title VII to claims for back pay 
and an injunction against future discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988), as 
amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 au-
thorized the imposition of compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional 
discrimination. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1072 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981a (Supp. V 1993)). The alleged acts of discrimination by BMC, however, 
occurred before November 1991. Landgraf v. US! Film Products, 114A S. Ct. 1483 
(1994), has held that the new provisions are not retroactive. 
58. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as ameded at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). 
59. See supra note 57. 
60. If, as I argue, an organization has standing to sue under Title VII, the 
organization also could receive compensatory damages. 
61. Havens, 455 U.S. at 378-79. One of the plaintiffs in the original suit who had 
not been dismissed for lack of standing had secured an injunction against the 
defendant's racial steering practices by the time the case reached the Supreme Court. 
Thus, the Court acquiesced in the organization's request that injunctive relief be 
removed from consideration. Id. at 370. The plaintiff organization and the defendants 
had entered into an agreement before the case reached the Supreme Court that the 
money damages amounted to $400 for each plaintiff. Id. at 371. In discussing whether 
that agreement had made the case moot, the Court said, "[i]frespondents [including 
the plaintiff organization] have suffered an injury that is compensable in money 
damages of some undetermined amount, the fact that they have settled on a measure 
of damages does not make their claims moot." Id. 
62. Id. at 379 (emphasis added). 
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seekers, there can be no question that the organization has 
suffered injury in fact. Such concrete and demonstrable 
injury to the organization's activities-with the consequent 
drain on the organization's resources-constitutes far more 
than simply a setback to the organization's abstract social 
interests . . . . 63 
Thus the court may have seen that two forms of injury were 
possible: first, the interference with the organization's pursuit 
of the "abstract goal" of racial integration, and second, the 
extra "drain on the organization's resources" to "identify and 
counteract" the defendants' covert and racially discriminatory 
practices-the latter being compensable by money damages.64 
Organizations which exist solely to detect discrimination 
through testing programs would suffer under the black-letter 
law· approach. Under this approach, an organization might 
lack standing if it does not function as a de facto employment 
agency for active job seekers, because it would not have sepa-
rate activities which would be drained by testing. This result 
would undermine testing for two reasons. First, individuals 
probably could not successfully conduct testing without sup-
port and training from an organization. Second, the law would 
be creating a perverse incentive which would force such an 
organization to tack on or invent functions collateral to its 
primary role. The organization should be able to function 
primarily or exclusively to aid and foster the building of a case 
for litigation because organizations like the FEC are non-profit 
organizations that operate on charitable gifts. Their resources 
are thus limited by the extent of the gifts, and they could 
obviously conduct more testing if they could expend resources 
solely on that activity.65 
63. Id. 
64. Id. An organization might also receive punitive damages under the Fair 
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(l) (1988), but to receive such damages the 
organization would not have to prove any injury to itself as an organization, but only 
that the defendant's discrimination was "reckless or callous." See, e.g., Smith v. 
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (stating the standard of proof for punitive damages); 
Ashbury v. Brougham, 866 F.2d 1276, 1282 (10th Cir. 1989) (same). 
65. Under the amended Title VII, an organization could secure reimbursement 
of the costs of the testing through a claim for compensatory damages, but only if it 
meets the test for standing and can claim an "injury." See supra note 57. In fairness 
terms, defendants who discriminate should be made to reimburse these costs since 
they are caused by the defendant's unlawful, covert conduct. Reimbursement would 
allow the FEC to investigate a greater number of employers and employment 
agencies which discriminate, thus hastening an end to employment discrimination. 
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B. The Public Rights Mode 
The limitations of the black-letter law approach suggest 
exploring the standing question under the public rights model. 
One commentator, Steven Winter, has put forth such a theory 
and has criticized the black-letter law approach because that 
approach has an individualist premise that rights are owned 
distinctly and separately by persons. 66 Winter argues that this 
assumption fails to recognize that "[s]ometimes the interests 
that society chooses to protect are shared by a community."67 
Winter notes that in order to bring such a suit, the framers of 
our Constitution accepted forms of suit by any common citizen 
against governmental unlawful actions, and that in order to 
bring such a suit, a citizen did not have to allege an injury 
from the illegal governmental conduct that was unique in 
comparison to that suffered by others.68 The citizen merely 
needed the information necessary to prove the governmental 
illegality. 69 
Winter further argues that nothing about the constitutional 
norms which govern the justiciability of suits in the courts 
should bar a legislative body from creating private rights to 
sue based on the public rights model. 70 If the defendant's 
conduct jeopardizes the public's interests, then Winter sees no 
difficulty in allowing any citizen who has the requisite infor-
mation about such conduct to sue to protect the public. 71 He 
argues that little distinguishes such legal actions from the 
various circumstances in which we allow, or require, one 
person to sue in a representative capacity on behalf of others. 72 
To be sure, some controls are necessary to assure adequate 
representation, but "these are instrumental considerations 
that present choices to be made, not moral evils pretermitted 
66. Winter, supra note 33, at 1480. 
67. Id. 
68. See id. at 1406-09 (explaining that a number oflaws in force at the framing 
of the Constitution allowed third party informers to bring an action to enforce the 
law). But cf. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209 
(1974) (holding that taxpayers and citizens do not have standing to sue to enjoin 
members of Congress from simultaneously holding positions in the military reserves 
in violation of Article I, Section 6, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution). 
69. Winter, supra note 33, at 1408-09. 
70. Id. at 1513-14. 
71. Id. at 1490-91. 
72. Id. at 1480. 
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by a priori philosophic or constitutional limitations."73 The 
public rights rationale would permit organizations like the 
FEC to function solely to generate litigation against a defen-
dant that has engaged in employment discrimination which 
resulted in injury to the public interest.74 
Winter's article, however, largely focuses on the standing 
barrier that the black-letter law approach creates to suing 
governmental bodies.75 Although Winter suggests an expansion 
of his model to the private sector, the history he uses to 
support his theory is grounded solely in suits to control gov-
ernmental bodies. Therefore, the model may not be easily 
translated into the private sector. It is easier to make the 
assumption that the public interest is affected by government 
action than by the action of any private party. Large private 
employers may be said to affect the public interest when they 
engage in systematic employment discrimination because they 
control a large number of employment opportunities. This 
claim is weaker with respect to small businesses, each of 
which may hire only one or two persons every two or three 
years. Moreover, fewer barriers prevent the federal govern-
ment from creating a cause of action against itself, where to 
do likewise with regard to private parties would confront 
constitutional problems. 76 I therefore am not confident that the 
73. Id. at 1480-81. 
7 4. Once it was given authority to initiate suit against private parties, the EEOC 
began to exercise that authority. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(0(1) (1988), the EEOC 
has the power to institute suits on behalf of aggrieved individuals who have filed 
charges. Additionally, id. § 2000e-6(e), a commissioner of the EEOC may file a charge 
where any defendant has engaged in a "pattern or practice" of illegal discrimination. 
MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 478-80 (1988). 
75. "All too often, the inevitable consequence of a decision denying standing is 
'that the most injurious and widespread Government [sic) actions c[an) be questioned 
by nobody.'" Winter, supra note 33, at 1381 (quoting United States v. Students 
Challenging Regulatory Action Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973)). 
76. Title III of the 1991 Civil Rights Act created a cause of action against the 
U.S. Senate for discrimination in employment. Government Employee Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, tit. III, 105 Stat. 1071, 1088 (codified as amended at 2 
U.S.C. §§ 1202-1224 (Supp. V 1993)). Under a unanimous consent agreement dated 
April 10, 1992, the U.S. Senate made the provisions retroactive to cover conduct 
which occurred 180 days prior to the effective date of the Act. See 138 CONG. REC. 
S5563 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1992). (The Senate Resolution amended sections of Title III 
of the Act governing the internal procedures that were enacted as part of the Senate's 
rulemaking authority, and therefore was not a unilateral amendment of a statute 
passed by Congress). The federal constitutional prohibition against the enactment of 
ex post facto laws probably would be violated if Congress retroactively sought to 
make illegal private conduct that was clearly lawful when the conduct occurred. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
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public rights model is an appropriate theory to support testing 
and litigation by organizations like the FEC. 
C. The Functional Approach 
The third theory-the functional approach-might provide 
a justification for conferring standing on individual testers and 
· the FEC, even when the plaintiffs sue private employers. This 
theory is attractive because of its simplicity and because it has 
been well developed by William A. Fletcher.77 Fletcher avoids 
trying to resolve standing issues in a single legal formula such 
as injury-in-fact, and abandons treating standing as a prelimi-
nary jurisdictional issue. Instead, he asserts that "standing 
should simply be a question on the merits of plaintiffs 
claim."78 
Some critics of traditional standing doctrine claim that the 
Supreme Court adheres to Fletcher's theory in deed if not in 
word, by making standing decisions through a covert judgment 
on the merits of the plaintiffs claim. 79 The Supreme Court in 
one arena, at least, appears to have embraced the Fletcher 
approach explicitly. In Rakas v. Illinois,80 the Court decided to 
"dispens[e] with the rubric of standing'' when determining 
whether a defendant in a criminal case had the right to com-
plain of a violation of the search and seizure provisions of the 
The federal government, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
probably could forbid racial discrimination in any component of the federal govern-
ment, no matter how small the unit. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 34 7 U.S. 497 (1954) 
(holding that racial discrimination violates due process under the Fifth Amendment). 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act limits its coverage to employers with 15 or more 
employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988). Congress may have to exempt some small 
employers from the legislation because there might be a claim that rights of free 
association would be jeopardized if they sought to control hiring in "mom and pop" 
businesses. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1959) (arguing that the obligation of a state 
to comply with the dictates of equal protection of the laws .under the Fourteenth 
Amendment may be conditioned by its obligation to respect rights of freedom of 
association under the First Amendment). 
77. Fletcher, supra note 34. 
78. Id. at 223. 
79. See Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law 
Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 22-23 (1982) (describing 
standing doctrine as a "litany" which the Court reiterates before it "chooses up sides 
and decides the case"). 
80. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
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Fourth Amendment, because such an analysis is "more prop-
erly [subsumed] under ... substantive Fourth Amendment 
doctrine."81 Thus, a straightforward decision on the merits of 
the defendant's claims that his Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated precludes "any theoretically separate, but invari-
ably intertwined concept of standing."82 
As shown by Fletcher andRakas, the merits of the claim are 
integral to deciding the issue of standing. The purposes and 
goals of the constitutional provision or the legislation claimed 
as the basis for a cause of action should dictate the ruling on 
standing. In Rakas, the Court decided that the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment was to protect personal privacy.83 Because 
searches and seizures by government officials are not per se 
unlawful, only those that reach a certain level of intrusion-
unreasonable searches and seizures-are deemed illegal. The 
nature of Fourth Amendment protections requires that the 
Court not rule on the "preliminary'' issue of standing until it 
thoroughly analyzes the substantive issues in the case. A 
challenged ·search may be rendered completely legal if the 
owner. of the premises gives her consent. One cannot know 
that personal privacy has been unlawfully or unreasonably 
invaded unless the victim of the search, and not some third 
party, is before the Court. 
In Fletcher's analysis, he says that the Court has erred .in 
asserting that an individual must suffer an injury-in-fact 
before Congress can create a statute granting standing to such 
an individual.84 Fletcher says that injury is not a factual 
question, because all plaintiffs-even in those cases in which 
the Court withheld standing-can describe some interest of 
theirs which will be thwarted if they are not granted the relief 
available under the statute. Injury in Fletcher's terms becomes 
a legal question of whether the party before the court should 
be granted the reliefrequested. Further, Fletcher believes that 
if Congress has the constitutional authority to create a legal 
81. Id. at 140. 
82. Id. at 139. 
83. Id. at 143. 
84. According to Fletcher, the concept of injury-in-fact. developed late in the 
history of the Court's development of standing, in the case of Association of Data 
Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), and the injury concept 
became a firm constitutional prerequisite in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
Fletcher, supra note 34, at 229-30, 239-40. The Court, however, has resolved issues 
involving standing in many cases prior to these without the use of this concept. Cf. 
id. at 231 & n.60. 
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prohibition, it should also have substantial plenary authority 
to decide who should be included in the class of persons that 
have a cause of action to enforce the statute: no a priori proof 
of personal injury should have to be made out by that class of 
persons. 85 His analysis would deem it inappropriate to demand 
a showing of injury by individual testers or the FEC if Con-
gress intended them to be in the class of enforcers. 
Fletcher shows, quite adequately, that the issue of injury-in-
fact often turns on the characterization of the plaintiffs legal 
interest.86 He addresses this through an examination ofthird-
party standing. Here the black-letter law states that a person 
who is not injured-in-fact has no standing to seek legal protec-
tion for another whose rights may have been violated. In at 
least one line of cases, the doctrine of third-party standing has 
given way to allow individuals to assert their own rights in the 
area of discrimination. In Barrows v. Jackson,81 the Court 
granted a white person third-party standing to challenge a 
racially restricted covenant, because the Court felt Blacks 
excluded from purchasing the property were the only persons 
injured-in-fact.88 Yet later, in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co.,89 the Court granted standing to a white resi-
dent resisting racial segregation in housing as a party who 
was injured-in-fact because he had a right to a racially inte-
grated environment.90 
A similar analysis could be applied to testers and the FEC 
regarding their right to enforce the laws against discrimina-
tion in employment, for they could be characterized as parties 
seeking to enforce the rights of others. Testers and the FEC 
have interests which are jeopardized by employment discrim-
ination. For individual testers, it is a desire to obtain correct 
information on jobs from employment agencies and to avoid 
the humiliation of racial prejudice. For the FEC, it is an 
interest in seeing that the resources it expends on ending 
employment discrimination bear fruit. Like the white plaintiffs 
above, their interests are merely not as strong as Black per-
sons who are actively seeking employment free of racial dis-
crimination. Nevertheless, that does not per se disable testers 
85. Fletcher, supra note 34, at 223. 
86. Id. at 245. 
87. 346 U.S. 249 (1953). 
88. Id. at 257; Fletcher, supra note 34, at 245-46. 
89. 409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
90. Id. at 211-12; Fletcher, supra note 34, at 245-46. 
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and the FEC from being designated by Congress as proper 
parties to enforce the statute where a legal duty that Congress 
has created is being violated. Fletcher believes that the prime 
question to be asked is whether Congress would have seen the 
plaintiffs-testers and the FEC-as appropriate parties to 
enforce the statute.91 To be sure, some of the questions raised 
by the cases on standing must be adverted to. For example, do 
the plaintiffs have interests which are antagonistic to those of 
the prime beneficiaries under the statute? In the context of the 
employment discrimination law, the interests of the testers 
and the FEC are not only congruent, but the testers and the 
FEC ferret out covert discrimination that bona fide job seekers 
may not know exists. 
Fletcher believes that one must plumb the goals of federal 
legislation to determine who should be able to enforce it.92 
Congress intended to rid the workplace of arbitrary discrimi-
nation when it passed Title VIl,93 and has not wavered from 
that goal in the intervening years. It consistently has amended 
Title VII to strengthen the hand of the plaintiff class in order . 
to more thoroughly eradicate employment discrimination. 94 
Arguably, under the terms posed by Fletcher, if the tester 
approach is sometimes the only means of effectively enforcing 
91. Fletcher, supra note 34, at 265. 
92. Id. at 253. 
93. In Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971), the court 
concluded that the phrase "a person claiming to be aggrieved" in Title VII showed "a 
congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III 
of the Constitution." Id. at 446. The Supreme Court, in Trafficante v. Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), quoted this language approvingly in holding that 
Congress had the same intention with respect to the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which 
outlawed housing discrimination. Id. at 209. 
94. Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 
§ 330, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)), as an addition 
to Title VII's definition section, which specifies that "[t]he terms 'because of sex' or 
'on the basis of sex' include ... because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, 
or related medical conditions." Id. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, supra note 57, the 
1991 Civil Rights Act authorized the imposition of compensatory and punitive 
damages in cases of intentional discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993). 
Furthermore, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 mandated that Title VII's prohibitions 
against employment discrimination apply to corporations incorporated outside the 
United States which are controlled by an American employer. Id. § 2000e-l(c). 
Finally, the 1991 Act codified the burden of proof framework set forth in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), governing disparate impact cases. Id. § 2000e-
2(k). This step assures plaintiffs the right to prove discrimination under disparate 
impact analysis by showing that a neutral criteria or measure used by the defendant 
disproportionately denies members of the protected class access to an employment 
opportunity or benefit. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32. 
20 University of Michigan Journal, of Law &form [VOL. 28:1 
the ban on hiring discrimination, then individual testers and 
organizations like the FEC should be included as enforcing 
agents.95 
II. A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR YELNOSKY'S 
ARGUMENT THAT TESTERS HAVE NO CLAIM 
TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF OR ATTORNEYS' FEES 
In a recent article,96 Michael J. Yelnosky questions the 
ability of lawsuits brought by private parties engaging in 
testing to ferret out employment discrimination, and also 
argues that the EEOC presently has no authority to engage in 
testing for employment discrimination.97 This Part will refute 
a number of Professor Yelnosky's positions. 
A. The Underenforcement Hypothesis 
Professor Y elnosky preliminarily proposed that testing should 
be limited to lower-skilled, entry-level jobs.98 To support this 
position, he argued, inter alia, that the difficulty of proving 
discrimination against applicants for low-level jobs and the low 
back pay awards for prevailing plaintiffs in those jobs combine 
to deter private counsel from taking such cases, thus creating 
an "enforcement void."99 He also argued that employers of 
higher-skilled persons incur higher costs· in processing app-
lications, and that therefore, imposing the costs of processing 
testers who will ultimately refuse an offer would be unfair to 
95. The Havens Court, working from a black-letter law approach, did not grant 
standing to the whites who were a part of the testing because the Court found that 
they had not alleged the specific injury-rights of association-with sufficient clarity. 
455 U.S. at 374-75. Under Fletcher's approach, the whites would have standing 
because they were an integral and necessary part of the testing process. 
96. Yelnosky, supra note 31. 
97. Id. at 459-69. 
98. Id. at 410-15, 429 n.121. 
99. Id. at 411-12. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added the possibility of compensa-
tory and punitive damages for intentional discrimination in employment. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981a (Supp. V 1993). Professor Yelnosky acknowledged that it is "too early to tell" 
if such damages will be substantial and thus undermine his hypothesis of an 
enforcement void for low paying jobs. See Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 412 n.35. 
FALL 1994] Employment Discrimination Testing 21 
employers.10° Finally, he indicated that applicants for high-level 
jobs have greater incentives to sue and are more likely to 
succeed when they are not hired. 101 
Several factors make those preliminary assumptions ques-
tionable. The overwhelming bulk of employment discrimination 
suits since Title VII's passage have involved jobs for semi-
skilled and unskilled employment, not jobs for professionals, 
executives, and other higher-skilled persons.102 This is probably 
due to the fact that lower-level jobs present less difficulty in 
proving discrimination, precisely because there are fewer 
subjective variables behind which a discriminating employer 
can hide. 103 The tester approach may be more necessary and 
appropriate for high-level employment because, as Professor 
Yelnosky acknowledged, "[t]he use of testers can uncover 
employment discrimination that otherwise is unprovable 
because of its subtle form."104 
Moreover, state agencies or the EEOC perform basic inves-
tigative work and ultimately find that either the case has 
merit-a finding of"reasonable cause" to believe that discrimi-
nation had occurred--or that it lacks merit-"no reasonable 
cause."105 If one assumes that the agencies have done a mini-
mally adequate investigative job, few of the cases found to have 
"no reasonable cause" for suit deserve to be pursued, and cases 
that are found to have "reasonable cause" will be more 
attractive to a private attorney. 
A more significant flaw in Professor Yelnosky's proposal that 
testing be limited to lower-skilled employment is that minori-
ties and women already occupy a disproportionate number of 
low-paid, low-skilled jobs, even when one holds constant levels 
of education and preparation.106 F_'urther, Professor Yelnosky's 
100. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 412. 
101. Id. at 415. 
102. Elizabeth Bartholet,Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. 
L. REV. 945, 949 (1982) (suggesting that litigation around blue collar employment may 
have predominated in the early years of Title VII because there are many more of such 
jobs and because Title VII did not include academic institutions and the public sector 
until the 1972 amendments to the Act). 
103. Id. at 959-78 (arguing that plaintiffs have less success in litigating high-level 
employment discrimination claims because courts have been too deferential to methods 
of choosing and evaluating professionals, while courts aggressively challenge blue 
collar selection procedures). 
104. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 413. 
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988). 
106. See David H. Swinton, The Economic Status of African Americans: Limited 
Ownership and Persistent Inequality, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1992, at 61, 
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supposition that such jobs provide "the possibility to establish 
a 'foothold' ... to move up the socioeconomic ladder"107 may not 
accurately describe many of these jobs. Many are dead-end jobs 
with wages kept depressed by an oversupply oflabor and little 
union protection. 108 Indeed, some economists hypothesize that 
race and sex discrimination is less present in unskilled and blue 
collar work than for any other kinds of work. 109 This finding 
accords with what we know are the stereotypes embedded in 
discrimination against minorities and women: many perceive 
them as capable of unskilled work, but lacking the capacity for 
jobs calling for higher levels ofintellect or the ability to manage 
subordinates.110 The tester approach, therefore, could be wasted 
on the class of employers who engage in the least amount of 
active discrimination in regard to the least attractive jobs, 
when the real underenforcement problem could involve higher-
level jobs which pay a living wage. 111 
61-118 (Billy J. Tidwell ed., 1992). Black males were less than half as likely as white 
males to be in executive, administrative, or managerial positions. On the other hand, 
Black males were "significantly more likely" than white males to be in less desirable 
jobs such as laborer or service worker. Id. at 106. 
107. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 415. 
108. See WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND 
CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 106 {2d ed. 1978) {discussing the causes of unem-
ployment among Black workers). 
109. Wilson comments as follows: 
Id. 
Jobs in the low wage sector, particularly in urban areas where most blacks are 
concentrated, have a considerably lower percentage of white workers and a 
substantially higher percentage of black workers than jobs in the corporate and 
govei::nment sectors .... It is not surprising therefore that recent studies of 
unemployment in the urban core reveal that blacks do not experience any special 
employment barriers in the casual, low-paid, and menial jobs of the low-wage 
sector. 
The Urban Institute performed a study using testers which found that Black 
applicants confronted racial discrimination more frequently in applying for white collar 
positions than for blue collar work. Urban Institute Research Using Testers Documents 
Bias Against Black Job Seekers, Daily Lab. Rep. {BNA) No. 94, at A-4 {May 15, 1991) 
[hereinafter Urban Institute]. 
Congress certainly views the exclusion of minorities and women from high-level 
jobs as a priority, for in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, they included the Glass 
Ceiling Act to study discrimination against women and minorities in high-level 
executive jobs. Glass Ceiling Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, tit. II, 105 Stat. 1081. 
110. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
111. This is not to suggest that the tester approach should never be used to uncover 
discrimination in unskilled work. In many cities, young Blacks, especially males, have 
exceedingly high levels .of unemployment. Securing employment for such persons would 
have double benefits because it might indirectly reduce the levels of crime in Black 
neighborhoods. Unfortunately, factors other than race discrimination may reduce 
FALL 1994] Employment Discrimination Testing 23 
Professor Yelnosky asserts that persons with high-level skills 
do not need the tester approach because they will be more 
motivated to file suit against hiring discrimination. 112 The 
typical age discrimination case undermines his assertion be-
cause the overwhelming majority of the charges allege dis-
crimination in discharge or lay-off and not in hiring.113 This is 
true despite the fact that age discrimination complainants are 
frequently sophisticated managers and professionals, and the 
fact that once unemployed, older workers look for work for 
significantly longer periods of time than their younger 
counterparts. 114 Thus, older workers likely experience signifi-
cant hiring discrimination. 
Professor Yelnosky's assertion that persons with high-level 
skills have more incentive to file discrimination complaints 
against hiring discrimination is not borne out by the behavior 
of these white collar unemployed. They are probably more 
certain of their ability to prove discrimination in layoffs because 
they often have a record of long service to the company they 
sued and thus know its internal personnel needs. They may not 
have that level of information when they apply to a new 
company, nor will they know the qualifications, or age, of the 
successful applicants. Proving hiring discrimination against 
high-level employees over forty years-old might be difficult. 
That, however, makes it especially ripe for the additional 
support of a tester approach.115 
employment opportunities for ghetto youth, such as the movement oflow-skilled work 
to the suburbs or the disappearance of such jobs through technological advances. See 
WILSON, supra note 6, at 100-04. The flight to the suburbs, however, may be driven 
by a flight from ethnic minorities and the elderly. See Marley S. Weiss,Risky Business: 
Age and Race Discrimination in Capital Redeployment Decisions, 48 MD. L. REV. 901 
(1989) (arguing that capital redevelopment decisions are violations of the anti-
discrimination laws). 
112. See Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 414-15. 
113. LAWRENCE A F'ROLIK & ALlJSoN P. BARNEs, ELDERLAW: CASF.S AND MATERIALS 116 
(1992). 
114. Id. 
115. A premise in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), is that 
an inference of discrimination arises when an employer operates against her own 
economic interest and does not hire the first qualified applicant for an unfilled job. 
Id. at 802. The tester approach might not yield such clear evidence of discrimination 
when applied to high-level jobs because employers, even those with no intention to 
discriminate, may not have a practice of hiring the first minimally qualified applicant. 
Such employers may develop a pool of applicants first, and then make a choice, 
reducing the significance of the sequence of applications. Testing for high-level jobs 
may require giving minorities and women better qualifications than the person with 
whom they are paired. See the discussion of manufactured credentials, infra notes 
229-38. 
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B. Testing High-Level Employment ls Not Too Costly 
Professor Yelnosky, after an exhaustive canvass of the 
applicable law, concludes that private persons have standing 
to sue based on testing which discloses employment discrimi-
nation.116 Despite this conclusion, Professor Yelnosky suggests 
that a number of limitations should be placed on the right to 
test, such as his recommendation that employers of highly 
skilled or professional employees be exempt from such testing 
because of additional processing costs.117 If one assumes that 
Congress structured Title VII to permit testing, 118 that includes 
an implicit policy judgment that testing is a legitimate, 
approved activity and that the benefits of weeding out 
discrimination outweigh the costs to innocent employers who 
may be subjected to the process. 
The employer who is found to be actively discriminating has 
no legitimate basis for objecting to the additional costs imposed 
by testing. The discriminating employer, by definition, is one 
who, on the basis of race or gender, pays little or no attention 
to the application of the "disfavored" tester. The costs of proc-
essing the "favored" tester and the costs of defending litigation 
unsuccessfully are more appropriately ascribed to the employ-
er's decision to operate unlawfully. 
In order to prevent blameless employers from unjustly 
incurring costs, and to make testing as effective as possible, 
testing should focus only on those employers who present some 
indicia of unlawful discrimination prior to the tests. 119 Al though 
116. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 415-29. 
117. Id. at 414-15. 
118. The author could find no discussion of the tester approach in the legislative 
history surrounding the initial adoption of Title VII in 1964. Nor do any of the cases 
approving testing in the housing field cite any legislative history on the precise 
question. It is not surprising, however, that Congress did not focus on the issue 
explicitly at that time, because the effectiveness of such an approach would become 
apparent only when traditional means of enforcement had become frustrated by 
defendants adopting covert strategies to undermine compliance. Senator Alan Simpson 
considered introducing an amendment to the 1991 Civil Rights Act that presupposed 
that the Commission would have the right to use testers, but would have precluded 
them from using testers who misrepresented their education or other qualifications. 
137 CONG. REC. S15,487 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Simpson). The 
amendment was not officially proposed. Id. at S15,488. Given this ambiguous history, 
the courts are likely to be the instrument for such interstitial lawmaking on the issue 
of standing. 
119. For example, employers could be targeted for testing when they exhibit a 
profile with no minority or female employees, or serious underrepresentations in 
certain job categories. 
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researchers have tested randomly to establish the statistical 
validity of the results, 120 testing to develop litigation should not 
be random. Employers who have demonstrated their non-
discriminatory hiring policies should not be targeted. If only 
a suspect group of employers is the focus of rational testing, 
the number of innocent employers tested ought to be low, thus 
reducing the harmful side effects feared by Professor Y elnosky. 
Moreover, in order to further reduce wasted expenditure, the 
FEC instructs testers to immediately turn down an employment 
offer to prevent the employer from losing access to a bona fide 
applicant. 121 
-C. Challenges to the Testers' Right to Injunctive Relief, 
Class Actions, and Attorneys' Fees 
Professor Yelnosky believes that the EEOC must be the prime 
user of the testing approach. He asserts that private testers 
will not qualify for injunctive relief or worthwhile compensatory 
and punitive damages, and therefore suggests that the private 
bar may not take such cases.122 He predicts that private testers 
will obtain, at best, empty declaratory judgments which simply 
announce that Title Vii has been violated, but which do not 
provide prospective rel~ef of any substance.123 
Professor Yelnosky is really revisiting the standing question 
in an altered form. 124 The effect of standing doctrine is to 
120. The Urban Institute developed a research design to determine the general 
level of discrimination against Black applicants for employment. See Urban Institute, 
supra note 108, at A-4. The researchers needed a representative sample of employers 
in order to make the finding that in one out of every five cases, a white applicant 
"advance[d] farther through the hiring process than the equally qualified black 
applicant." Id. at A-4 to A-5. Poorly focused testing in the context of litigation would 
be highly inefficient four out of five times. Id. 
121. There may be another class of "innocent" employers-those in which top 
management has a non-discriminatory policy that is undermined by lower-level 
managers who make the actual hiring decisions. These employers, however, need not 
wait to be sued. They could take precautionary steps to avoid litigation by adopting 
an internal testing program to find out whether lower-level managers are faithfully 
carrying out their non-discrimination policy, especially if their actual hiring data does 
not reflect their written policies. The FEC has offered to provide technical guidance 
to employers who would like to adopt such a regime. Withers Interview, supra note 
29. 
122. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 435-38, 443-45. 
123. Id. at 439-41. 
124. See supra Part I for a discussion of standing in this context. 
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preclude the results which Yelnosky predicts. It prevents the 
courts from addressing abstract questions about legality which 
do not have an impact on concrete relationships between 
parties. As the following analysis shows, courts can find many 
concrete relationships around which to structure relief. 
1. Testers May Obtain Injunctive Relief-Because testers 
cannot accept employment if offered, they are necessarily 
precluded from seeking relief either in the form of back pay or 
a court order that they be hired immediately. The question 
remains, however, whether testers are entitled to an injunction 
on a class action basis against the employer to bar him from 
continuing discriminatory hiring practices. On this point, 
Professor Y elnosky expressed doubt that courts would be 
willing to issue injunctions. He observed that a series of courts 
refused to grant an injunction unless the record contained 
evidence of widespread, pervasive discrimination. 125 None of the 
cases he cites, however, impose such a finding as a strict 
precondition to granting an injunction, 126 and he admits that 
one case expressly denies that proof of a "history of prior 
discriminatory practices" is necessary before an injunction can 
be granted.127 
Professor Y elnosky fails to make the distinction made by 
Professor Robert Belton in the only volume which is devoted 
exclusively to remedies under employment discrimination 
laws. 128 Belton reads the case law to make an injunction 
mandatory when a plaintiff produces "abundant evidence of a 
consistent pattern of past discrimination and the absence of 
evidence ... of a reasonable possibility of future compliance."129 
In other cases where the plaintiff produces proof that a 
defendant has intentionally violated Title VII, Afbemarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody 130 "imposes an obligation on the district court to 
issue an injunctive decree which will ... bar like discrimination 
in the future. "131 Belton indicates that courts should impose a 
"presumption of entitlement" to injunctive relief once a violation 
125. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 436. 
126. Id. at 436 n.163. 
127. Id. at 436 n.162 (quoting Berkman v. City of New York, 705 F.2d 584, 595 
(2d Cir. 1983), which held that relief designed to assure compliance is "appropriate 
whenever a Title VII violation [is] found, irrespective of any history of prior 
discriminatory practices or the intent of the defendant"). 
128. RoBERT BELTON, REMEDIES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (1992). 
129. Id. at 207. 
130. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
131. BELTON, supra note 128, at 203 (citing Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418). 
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is proven, and that the court's discretion in "denying injunctive 
relief in any form" is "limited."132 Thus, a better reading of the 
cases cited by Professor Yelnosky is that an injunction should 
issue when a clear violation of Title VII is found, unless 
something in the record either shows that the employer has 
ended its discrimination in a manner which makes a reoccur-
rence unlikely or which reveals a structural impediment that 
would prevent the plaintiff or members of her class from being 
harmed in the future. 133 
Professor Y elnosky also reasoned that testers cannot obtain 
injunctions because testers cannot meet the "personal benefit" 
requirement for injunctive relief, since they are not searching 
for employment at the time of the defendant's discrimination.134 
The analysis of the court of appeals in BMC Marketing Corp. 135 
runs counter to his reasoning. The court remanded the case to 
allow the district court to entertain an amendment of the 
complaint by the individual plaintifftesters.136 If the individu-
als alleged that they were likely to return to the defendant 
employment agency in the reasonably near future as bona fide 
applicants, and that the defendant had a settled policy ofracial 
discrimination, then an injunction could issue. 137 If the 
132. Id. at 203, 208. 
133. Id. at 207. Professor Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 436 n.163, cites the following 
cases in which injunctions were denied: Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 
660-61 (4th Cir. 1990) (denying an injunction in a situation where an employer had 
fired the supervisor who had sexually harassed the plaintiffi; EEOC v. Financial 
Assurance, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 686, 695 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (denying an injunction in the 
absence of pressure by the EEOC and the absence of any evidence in the record that 
the defendant had engaged in similar discrimination in the past). 
In some cases cited by Professor Yelnosky, the plaintiffs voluntary action made 
the prospective injunctive reliefclearly inapplicable. In Hampton v. IRS, 913 F.2d 180, 
182 (5th Cir. 1990), plaintiff alleged that his reassignment was motivated by racial 
discrimination, but did not contest his subsequent discharge, therefore an injunction 
ordering his reinstatement was not appropriate. In Backus v. Baptist Medical Ctr., 
671 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 (8th Cir. 1982), the plaintiff left the defendant's employ 
voluntarily during the pendency of the employment discrimination suit and thus could 
not secure an injunction for reinstatement. 
134. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 437. 
135. 28 F.3d 1268, .1274 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
136. Id. at 1275. 
137. See id. The court of appeals disagreed with the way the lower court distin-
guished City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). In Lyons, the plaintiff was 
denied an injunction to prevent the local police from continuing the practice of applying 
a chokehold in their traffic stops and arrests on the grounds that the plaintiff could 
not demonstrate that he was likely to be the object of such unconstitutional police 
behavior in the future. 461 U.S. at 111. The lower court in BMC Mktg. Corp. held that 
the tester plaintiffs had established a probability of future injury because unlike an 
arrest, which must be initiated by the police, the testers "are free to return to BMC 
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individual testers made the same allegations with respect to 
an employer, they too should have a right to injunctive relief. 
Professor Yelnosky admits that some of the cases he cites for 
the proposition that injunctive relief would be denied to testers 
are inconsistent with other Title VII cases.138 He also states 
that "[t]he decisions denying injunctive relief to nonemployee 
plaintiffs ignore Congress's purpose in empowering Title VII 
plaintiffs to act as private attorneys general vindicating both 
their own rights and the rights of others."139 Individual testers 
should be viewed as equivalent to nonemployed plaintiffs: their 
legal rights have been violated and they should be allowed to 
perform the quintessential role of "private attorneys general" 
on behalf of others. 140 
2. Testers Are in the Same Class as Bona Fide 
Applicants-Individual testers should be able to bring a class 
action and secure an injunction to bar hiring discrimination 
against all those in their class, just as an attorney general 
would. Professor Yelnosky argues that Supreme Court cases 
have prohibited classes from being drawn too broadly in Title 
VII actions, and he assumes that testers could not be in the 
same class as bona fide job applicants. 141 
Professor Yelnosky's assumption that testers and bona fide 
job seekers must be treated as members of separate classes is 
untenable from a legal or factual standpoint. Ifinjunctive relief 
were appropriate, as ·argued above, it could not be limited 
sensibly to plaintiffs in their testing posture.142 Clearly, the 
at any time in search of nondiscriminatory employment referrals .... they alone 
control the decision to initiate contact." BMC Mktg. Corp., 829 F. Supp. at 405. The 
court of appeals held that the individual tester plaintiffs must additionally allege that 
they intended to return to the defendant employment agency in the near future, and 
that the defendants had a settled policy of practicing racial discrimination. See 28 F .3d 
at 1274. The court of appeals thus read Lyons as refusing an injunction, in part 
because the plaintiff had not alleged that it was a settled policy of the City of Los 
Angeles to have its police apply excessive and unconstitutional force in arrests. See 
id. 
138. "This analysis [denying injunctive reliet] is somewhat inconsistent, however, 
with the courts' treatment of Title VII injunctions in other contexts." Yelnosky, supra 
note 31, at 438 n.164. 
139. Id. at 438 n.165. 
140. Coles v. Havens Realty Corp., 633 F.2d 384, 388 (4th Cir. 1980) (stating that 
there is no reason why surrogates for those who are victims of discrimination cannot 
pursue their cause). 
141. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 437. 
142. Such an injunction would produce an illogical order, enjoining the defendant 
from refusing an offer of employment to plaintiffs on racial grounds only when they 
were not seeking employment. · 
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injunctive order would have to protect the plaintiffs against 
racial discrimination should they, at any time prospectively, 
elect to become bona fide job seekers. Therefore, the order 
would naturally protect other prospective bona fide job seekers. 
Neither of the two cases Professor Yelnosky cites supports 
treating testers and bona fide applicants as different classes. 
East Texas Motor Freight Systems, Inc. v. Rodriguez143 holds 
that three Mexican-Americans who were not qualified for 
promotions-and thus had no legal rights violated because 
they did not receive promotions-could not represent a class 
of Mexican-Americans who were qualified and were claiming 
a denial of promotion on the grounds of national origin 
discrimination.144 The case thus holds that persons who have 
not had any legal rights violated cannot represent persons 
whose legal rights have been violated. Even Professor 
Yelnosky acknowledges that if testers have had their rights 
violated, a declaratory judgment would be appropriate. 145 
The question then remains, whether the violations of the 
legal rights of testers are so distinct and separate from viola-
tions of rights of bona fide applicants that they cannot be in 
the same class. Professor Yelnosky cites General Telephone Co. 
of the Southwest v. Falcon, 146 which holds that a plaintiff 
alleging discrimination in promotions cannot represent a class 
of persons whose only claim is discrimination in hiring. 147 
Falcon thus is not support for treating testers and bona fide 
applicants as separate classes because, unlike the individuals 
in Falcon, they are not pursuing interests in two entirely 
different aspects of the employment process. Both groups are 
pursuing the same legal rights-either a right to have job 
information from employment agencies or job offers from 
employers on a racially non-discriminatory basis. Also, given 
the realities of the search for employment, testers in this 
context are not very different from persons who genuinely 
canvass the employment market. An employed person may 
inquire about employment opportunities without a firm deci-
sion to take a job even if one is eventually offered. Unem-
ployed persons may apply to many employers simultaneously: 
143. 431 U.S. 395 (1977). 
144. Id. at 403. 
145. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 439. 
146. 457 U.S. 147 (1982). 
147. Id. at 155, 158-59. 
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if they accept one offer, additional offers must be declined. 148 
Thus, many bona fide applicants are factually indistinguish-
able from testers from the point of view of the employer.149 
Although Professor Yelnosky cites a statement made in East 
Texas Motor Freight Systems, Inc. v. Rodriguez that a class 
representative must "suffer the same injury as class mem-
bers,"150 all class members are not forced to claim identical 
damages. Even in a single class of bona fide applicants, all of 
whom were denied employment on discriminatory grounds, 
class members could have different monetary damages de-
pending on whether they were employed or unemployed at the 
time of the discrimination, or whether they subsequently 
secured other employment in mitigation of damages. 151 
3. Testing Organizations May Recover Attorneys' Fees-
Professor Yelnosky does not discuss whether an organization 
that organizes the testing could have a right, separate from the 
individuals used in the testing, to secure an injunction and 
attorneys' fees. In BMC Marketing Corp., the court carefully 
scrutinized the standing issue and rejected some of the plain-
tiff's claims to standing, 152 but found that the FEC had standing 
148. If a plaintiff must have a fixed commitment to work only for the defendant-
employer, then the bulk of job seekers would not have standing. Most assuredly, most 
third-year law students, who apply to more than one employer for permanent 
employment upon graduation, would not be protected against race or sex discrimi-
nation in hiring. 
149. Moreover, bona fide applicants for employment have an obligation to mitigate 
damages by using "reasonable diligence" to obtain other employment pending the 
resolution of the charges. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g){l) (Supp. V 1993); Ford Motor 
Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982) (construing identical statutory language 
to require all unemployed Title VII claimants to use "reasonable diligence in finding 
other suitable employment"). If a bona fide applicant was employed at the time of the 
discrimination, or found other employment that was now permanent, and if either job 
paid well enough to defeat a claim for back pay, under Professor Yelnosky's stan-
dards, that person would be identical to a tester, for she would have no right to an 
injunction since she could show no "personal benefit" from prospective relief. 
150. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 438 n.166 (citing Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at 403). 
151. See, e.g., Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269, 1280 (4th Cir. 
1985) (awarding varying amounts of backpay damages to the different plaintiffs in 
a Title VII employment discrimination suit). 
152. The court rejected both the individual's and the organization's claims to 
standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1981(Supp.V1993). BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1271, 
1278-81. This Article is limited to an exploration of the testing under Title VII, so 
there will be no extended comment on this portion of the court's opinion. It is 
important to note, however, that the courts dispute whether Congress meant to 
exercise its full powers under Article III with respect to§ 1981 as it did with respect 
to Title VII. A recent note also opposes many of the arguments made by the court in 
BMC Mktg. Corp. See Michele Landever, Note, Tester Standing in Employment 
Discrimination Cases Under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1981, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 381 (1993). 
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to sue as an organization if it could prove that the defendant 
employment agency was disrupting the organization's goal of 
eradicating employment discrimination.153 Because the court's 
ruling came under the unamended version of Title VII, and the 
organization could not claim back pay, the only form of relief 
would be an injunction barring the defendant from prospective 
discrimination. Thus, the organization would be achieving 100% 
of its litigation goal and would therefore have a clear right to 
full attorneys' fees. This is critical, for as this Article has 
argued, the organization is the primary actor in the testing 
strategy. 
D. Impact of the 1991 Civil Rights Act 
The 1991 amendments to Title VII should have an impact on 
whether individual testers will have access to private attor-
neys. The amendments give a successful plaintiff a right to 
compensatory and punitive damages. 154 The substantial re-
covery that may result from this greater relief could. impact 
the level of attorneys' fees. Professor Yelnosky predicts, how-
ever, that such damages will be low in tester cases because in 
a few cases-each in the housing arena-testers recovered 
only $1000.155 Contrary to this prediction, when the trial court 
allowed juries to entertain compensatory and punitive 
damages for the testers led by the FEC, they gave each a total 
of$15,000. 156 Further, Professor Yelnosky's extrapolation from 
housing cases is inappropriate because damage awards for 
153. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1277-78. 
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993). 
155. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 443. 
156. Professor Yelnosky believes that the award was high in Fair Employment 
Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. Molovinsky, No. 91-7202 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 
12, 1993), because the facts were "particularly egregious." Yelnosky, supra note 31, 
at 443 n.185. The defendant sought to get the plaintiff testers to trade sex for job 
information. See supra note 29 for the facts of this case. Professor Yelnosky took note 
of the $10,000 in punitive damages, but did not further discover that each of the 
tester plaintiffs recovered an additional $5000 in compensatory damages. Withers 
Interview, supra note 29. The appellate court reversed the award of compensatory 
and punitive damages to the individual plaintiffs in BMC Mktg. Corp. on the grounds 
that the 1991 amendments to the 1964 Civil Rights Act were not retroactive, 28 F.3d 
at 1272, but the award illustrates what juries might do when compensatory and 
punitive damages are available under the 1991 amendments. 
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housing discrimination have traditionally been low. 157 It would 
not be surprising if juries find that erecting discriminatory 
barriers to employment is more serious than discrimination in 
housing, and thus warrants higher damages. A defendant who 
blocks minorities from access to employment does more 
damage than one who blocks minorities from housing, because 
access to employment is determinative of one's whole lifestyle, 
including where one can afford to live. The typical person 
looking for housing generally has housing and is simply 
looking for more convenient or attractive quarters. 
The most important impact on a plaintiff's likelihood of 
recovering attorneys' fees comes from the portion of the 1991 
amendments which, in part, reverses Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins. 158 In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court held that, 
although the defendant had in part relied on a discriminatory 
factor in denying an employment opportunity, Title VII was 
not violated ifthe defendant could establish that it would have 
made the same adverse decision if it had relied only on 
legitimate factors. 159 The Civil Rights Act amendments entitle 
a plaintiff to an injunction and attorneys' fees ifthe defendant 
relied on a discriminatory factor regardless of whether the 
157. Congress sought to address the problem oflow damage awards by amending 
the Fair Housing Act in 1988 to remove the $1000 cap on punitive damages. Fair 
Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 8(2), 102 Stat. 1633 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(l) (1988)). The level of awards for plaintiffs who made 
bona fide searches for housing became higher after the amendment, but low awards 
continued in some courts. See James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act 
of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1077-78 
(1989) ("[S)ingle victim settlements and awards during the past few years have 
generally exceeded twenty thousand dollars .... Nonetheless, some courts lag far 
behind the national pattern as they continue to make only symbolic awards 
reminiscent of an earlier era."). One commentator, taking note that damage awards 
continue to be an insufficient mechanism for abating housing discrimination, argues 
for additional affirmative relief. See Margalynne Armstrong, Desegregation Through 
Private Litigation: Using Equitable Remedies to Achieve the Purposes of the Fair 
Housing Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 909, 928-33 (1991) (arguing that courts should fashion 
injunctions to require defendants to rent or sell the property to a member of the 
plaintiff's class, if the plaintiff has found other accommodations). 
158. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
159. Id. at 258. In Price Waterhouse, the female plaintiff had been denied a 
promotion to partner in her accounting firm. Some of the partners relied on gender 
stereotypes, but others denied her a partnership because she had poor interpersonal 
skills. A majority of the Court decided that an employer would not violate the statute 
ifit could prove that even ifit had not taken gender into account unlawfully, it would 
have made the same decision regarding that person. Id. 
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employer is able to prove that it ultimately would have made 
the same adverse decision on lawful grounds. 160 
Professor Yelnosky reads this provision as authorizing an 
award of attorneys' fees only in "mixed motive" cases and 
asserts that it did not change the rule that plaintiffs like the 
testers, "who can prove a violation of the Act, but who are not 
entitled to significant relief," cannot recover attorneys' fees. 161 
He cites Slade v. United States Postal Service162 as a case that 
would remain unaffected by the amended Civil Rights Act in 
this respect. 163 The plaintiff in Slade argued that he was 
entitled to attorney fees because he had secured reversal of 
the district court on some preliminary procedural grounds 
which allowed the case to go forward on the merits. 164 The 
court determined that those procedural victories ultimately 
had not led to a substantive victory for the plaintiff, and 
therefore rejected the plaintiff's demand for attorneys' fees. 165 
I agree with Professor Yelnosky that the 1991 amendments do 
not require that attorneys' fees be awarded in a case like 
Slade. That case, however, is wholly unlike the case of a tester 
who does prevail on the merits and proves that the defendant 
was engaged in an intentional refusal to make a job offer 
solely because of race or sex. 
Under the amendments, Congress deemed the prevailing 
party to be the plaintiff who proved that the defendant relied 
on a discriminatory factor. Congress not only allowed recovery 
of attorneys' fees, but also authorized the issuance of an 
injunction to prohibit the defendant from engaging in future 
160. The new amendment provides that if the plaintiff "demonstrates that race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment 
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(m) (Supp. V 1993), and the respondent proves that it 
would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible moti-
vating factor, the court-
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief ... , and attorney's fees and 
costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim 
under Section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and 
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, 
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment .... 
Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
161. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 445 n.196. 
162. 952 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1991). 
163. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 445 n.196. 
164. 952 F.2d at 361-62. 
165. Id. at 362. 
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intentional discrimination.166 Under the amendment, a person 
who is expressly denied employment but who may have never 
qualified for employment with the discriminating employer is 
nonetheless authorized to act as a representative to secure an 
injunction protecting others against discrimination. The tester 
duplicates the position of the plaintiff in a mixed motive case 
in three ways: (1) she proves that the defendant engaged in 
intentional discrimination and (2) she acts as a representative 
to protect others from future discrimination (3) even though 
she is not entitled to a position with the defendant. The tester 
arguably has an even stronger claim to attorneys' fees because 
the tester may, unlike the plaintiff in a mixed motive case, 
recover punitive and compensatory damages under the 
amended Title Vll. 167 Professor Yelnosky's assertion that the 
1991 amendment has no effect on a tester's right to attorneys' 
fees168 would produce a paradoxical result. Under his interpre-
tation, a plaintiff in a mixed motive case who could have been 
refused an employment opportunity legitimately but who 
proved that the defendant introduced a discriminatory factor 
into the employment process would be entitled to an injunction 
and attorneys' fees. On the other hand, a plaintiff tester, who 
proved that the defendant's action resulted solely from 
discrimination would have no right to an injunction or 
attorneys' fees. Congress could not have intended such an 
irrational result. 
E. Breach of Contract, Barratry, and Ethical Violations 
Professor Yelnosky suggests that state common-law actions 
and disciplinary proceedings may be brought against testers 
and their attorneys as a means of deterring the use of testers. 
Professor Yelnosky sets forth three hypotheses: (1) that testers 
might be sued for breach of contract;169 (2) that lawyers 
representing them may be subject to charges of barratry;170 
and (3) that it may be unethical for the tester, if seen as an 
agent of the attorney, to make contact with an employer who 
is represented by counsel. 171 Professor Yelnosky seems to raise 
166. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993). 
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993). 
168. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 430-34. 
169. Id. at 446-51. 
170. Id. at 452. 
171. Id. at 455-58. 
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these issues only as straw men to be picked apart. Many of his 
claims regarding potential unethical activity have been refuted 
in an article published subsequent to his own.172 
Professor Yelnosky acknowledges that an employer pres-
ently does not have a breach of contract action whenever an 
applicant turns down a job offer. The possibility that some 
employers may begin to seek "certifications of a bona fide 
interest"173 from job applicants is unlikely to impact the law 
significantly because few employers would be likely to risk the 
chilling effect such an action could have on the entire job 
application process. Testers are not that different from bona 
fide applicants who ultimately turn down a job offer.174 Would 
employers want to invite a lawsuit every time that happened? 
These employer representatives probably have not thought 
through the potentially negative consequences for employers 
if they began to contractualize the job application process. 
Conversely, such a move might legitimate claims by all 
disappointed bona fide applicants that the employer had 
breached its obligation to consider their application in good 
faith whenever they did not receive an offer. This is hardly a 
road down which employers will want to venture. 
Professor Yelnosky also raises a number of potential state 
law impediments to organizations who wish to engage in 
testing.175 A shorthand response to these claims is that, if 
federal law gives private parties a right to test to litigate 
against employment discrimination, then these state law claims 
will be preempted if they unduly burdened that right. 176 In 
particular, Professor Yelnosky recognized the possible applica-
tion of NAACP v. Button111 to the claim of barratry. In that 
case, the Court held that Virginia violated the First Amend-
ment by using its barratry statutes to bar a lay organization 
from advising Blacks of their legal rights against racial 
segregation and referring them to a particular attorney.178 Such 
172. Alex Y.K. Oh, Using Employment Testers to Detect Discrimination: An Ethical 
and Legal Analysis, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 473 (1993). 
173. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 448. 
174. See supra notes 147-95 and accompanying text. 
175. See Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 446-59, where he discusses the ethical 
obligation not to deal with another lawyer's client. 
176. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (holding that federal law may 
preempt state law if the state law stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress"). See Yelnosky, supra note 
31, at 471-73. 
177. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
178. Id. at 426, 428-29. 
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litigation was deemed to be a form of political expression.179 
Professor Yelnosky, however, suggests that Button might not 
protect lawyers who counsel testers because "the use of testers 
is intended to create a cause of action and not simply to 
encourage individuals to assert existing causes of action. "180 
This distinction is not persuasive. In one sense, the cause of 
action exists in the employment arena in exactly the same way 
that a cause of action existed in the context of Button. One may 
safely presume that the defendant employer has regularly 
engaged in a pattern and practice of racially based refusals to 
hire Blacks in the same way that Virginia officials regularly 
refused to allow Blacks to attend public schools with whites. 
The only difference in the employment arena is that the racial 
discrimination is covert rather than overt as in Button. 
Discrimination's covert quality does not mean that a cause of 
action does not exist, or that it is not an ongoing violation of 
the law. From this standpoint, the tester is merely collecting 
evidence to prove an already existent claim. Testing merely 
enables the right person--one who has been "injured" in 
standing parlance-to bring suit. This role is not very different 
from the one played in the context of Virginia's segregated 
schools. Only persons who could prove a certain relationship 
with the defendant school board--current students who were 
"injured" by the policy-had standing to sue. As a practical 
matter, in both situations lay persons had to be informed by 
attorneys that their rights and the rights of those similarly 
situated were being violated. 
Perhaps Professor Yelnosky is arguing that an attorney 
cannot advise a prospective client about the law of standing 
because this advice might generate client activity which would 
"create" a cause of action. 181 An attorney does not function 
unethically in this context any more than an attorney who 
informed Black parents in Virginia that their children would 
have to transfer from private schools to the public schools if 
they wanted to have standing to sue the public school board to 
end racial segregation. Furthermore, an attorney who gives a 
lay person legal advice about how to become a "private attorney 
general" must be protected by Title VII because the statute is 
179. Id. at 431. 
180. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 455. 
181. Id. at 451. 
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designed to encourage lay persons to function in that role. 182 
Such activity furthers the public interest in attaining a 
discrimination-free workplace. 
Only one case was decided involving testers in the employ-
ment context prior to the 1991 amendments. In Lea u. Cone 
Mills Corp., 183 the lower court refused to award the plaintiff 
testers attorneys' fees because attorneys participated in 
"recruiting the plaintiffs."184 The court of appeals disagreed, 
upholding the testers' rights to an injunction and attorneys' 
fees.185 
F. EEOC Authority with Regard to Testing 
The EEOC has issued a policy guideline asserting that testers 
have standing to sue. 186 The EEOC backed away from exploring 
whether the agency itself had the authority to use testers after 
criticism from representatives of the business conimunity. 187 
Professor Yelnosky suggests that Congress should amend 
Title VII to authorize the EEOC to engage in testing because 
the agency does not have statutory authority to engage in 
testing before or after a charge has been filed. 188 Moreover, 
despite Professor Yelnosky's recognition that private parties 
who test have standing to sue, he also concludes that the EEOC 
"cannot ... orchestrate the use of testers by private groups."189 
1. The EEOC's Authority to Coordinate and Utilize Testing 
by Others-Preliminarily, Professor Yelnosky's analysis does 
not take into account the provisions governing the EEOC's 
powers which are pertinent to the issue of whether it can be 
involved, either independently or in conjunction with others, 
in a program of testing to carry out its statutory mission. 
182. See Coles v. Willis, 633 F.2d 384, 388 (4th Cir. 1980) (noting the role of 
plaintiffs in Title VII as "private attorneys general"). 
183. 301 F. Supp. 97 (M.D.N.C. 1969), modified, 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971). 
184. 301 F. Supp. at 102. 
185. 438 F.2d at 88. One commentator, however, believes that "the Lea court's 
abbreviated analysis provides little to build upon and [that] the tester standing issue 
is not dispositively addressed." Anderson, supra note 45, at 1219. 
186. Policy Guidance, Notice No. N-915-062, [2 Interpretations] EEOC Compl. Man. 
(CCH) 'I 2168, at 2313-15 (Nov. 20, 1990). 
187. See Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 409 n.17. 
188. Id. at 468-69. 
189. Id. at 462. 
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Yelnosky asserts that the Commission could not support private 
parties who engaged in testing, an activity that he presumes 
is lawful and legitimate, 190 although Title VII expressly states 
that "[t]he Commission shall have power-(1) to cooperate with 
and, with their consent, utilize regional, State, local, and other 
agencies, both public and private, and individuals."191 
This provision provides a reasonable basis to argue that the 
EEOC is empowered to work with private individuals, private 
organizations like the FEC, and even state agencies which do 
have the authority to engage in testing. 192 Indeed, such a 
cooperative arrangement could prevent one of the very abuses 
of testing about which Professor Yelnosky expressed some 
concern. He indicated that employers who were not engaged 
in hiring discrimination could claim that the burden of 
processing applications of testers who actually were not seeking 
employment was cast upon them.193 The EEOC collects data 
which, if shared with private organizations, would prompt the 
testers to avoid targeting employers with a profile of hiring 
minorities and women on a non-discriminatory basis. 1!14 To read 
the statute as blocking such cooperation is to impair the 
efficiency of the testing and to increase the number of innocent 
employers who are subjected to the process. 
190. Id. at 415-29. 
191. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g) (1988) (emphasis added). 
192. Professor Yelnosky notes that the Massachusetts Commission Against Dis-
crimination used testers in 1993 to enforce their local employment discrimination 
statutes. See Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 406 n. 7 (citing Massachusetts Agency Settles 
Job Tester Cases, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 77, at A-18 (Apr. 23, 1993)). 
It is even possible that the Commission has the statutory authority to help finance 
a testing program undertaken by a state agency: 
The Commission may cooperate with State and local agencies charged with 
the administration of State fair employment practices laws and, ... within the 
limitation of funds appropriated specifically for such purpose, engage in and 
contribute to the cost of research and other projects of mutual interest 
undertaken by such agencies .... 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b) (1988) (emphasis added). 
193. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 414-15; see supra Part II.B. 
194. Professor Yelnosky rightly observes that proof of hiring discrimination for low-
level jobs is made more difficult because, "[g]enerally there is little if any paper 
record." Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 412. The EEOC, however, has the regulatory 
power to define what records employers must "make and keep" that are "relevant to 
the determinations of whether unlawful employment practices have been or are being 
committed." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) (1988). Pursuant to this authority the Commission 
could begin to require employers with disproportionately low percentages of minorities 
and women to keep records on hiring decisions to fill the gap. 
FALL 1994) Employment Discrimination Testing 39 
Testing requires organizational backing to provide training, 
discipline, and control of the process to produce a clear picture 
of discrimination. 195 This Article argues that because it is 
crucial that the testing process be guided in a fair manner, 
entities such as the FEC should have organizational standing 
to sue in addition to the persons used as testers. Indeed, as 
Professor Yelnosky notes, employer representatives have called 
for the EEOC to establish some "minimum standards offairness 
[to] be observed by testers."196 Congress empowered the EEOC 
to give "technical assistance and training regarding the laws" 
it enforces, 197 and this could provide the statutory basis for 
training private organizations that wish to set up testing 
programs. 
As previously suggested, employers could use the testing 
process to establish a litigation-free means of uncovering hiring 
discrimination that may occur at lower levels in the corpora-
tion, unbeknownst to superiors in the company. 198 The 
Commission could aid employers in structuring an internal 
testing program because it is empowered "to furnish to persons 
subject to this subchapter such technical assistance as they 
may request to further their compliance with this subchapter 
or an order issued thereunder."199 
Using testers is an excellent means of gauging the extent of 
hiring discrimination in employment, as revealed by studies 
conducted by the Urban Institute.200 The Commission is 
authorized to engage in research independently or in con-
junction with state and local fair employment practice agencies 
and to publish the results.201 Under these provisions, the 
Commission could conduct a research program using testers to 
195. Coordination also could avoid entangling innocent employers in poorly 
conducted testing. 
196. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 407 n.14. 
197. "The Commission shall establish a Technical Assistance Training Institute, 
through which the Commission shall provide technical assistance and training 
regarding the laws and regulations enforced by the Commission." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
4(j)(l) (Supp. V 1993). 
198. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
199. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(3) (1988). 
200. See Urban Institute, supra note 109, at A-4. 
201. Title VII provides that "[t)he Commission shall have the power- ... (5) .to 
make such technical studies as are appropriate to effectuate the purposes and policies 
of this subchapter and to make the results of such studies available to the public;" 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g) (1988), and that "[t]he Commission may cooperate with State 
and local agencies charged with the administration of State fair employment practice 
laws and ... engage in and contribute to the cost of research." Id. § 2000e-8(s). 
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gauge the level of hiring discrimination nationally or in any 
given region. Professor Yelnosky's conclusion would mean that 
the Commission could not use evidence of discrimination 
gathered in such research to file a charge, or in support of a 
private individual's charge, no matter how compelling. 
2. The EEOC's Authority to Engage in Testing-The forego-
ing reveals the multiple means that empower the Commission 
to be involved indirectly with a testing program. Professor 
Yelnosky's conclusion that the Commission is forbidden to use 
testers directly to uncover or prove discrimination, either 
before a plaintiff files a charge or after, is also deeply flawed. 
Professor Yelnosky bases his argument that the EEOC lacks 
authority to conduct an undercover oper;:ition upon a single 
court decision that determined that the EEOC could not be 
sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) because the 
FTCA only authorized suits against criminal law enforcement 
agencies.202 
The problem with this argument lies in some of its assump-
tions. First, Professor Y elnosky assumes that the undercover 
operation conducted in employment testing is identical to an 
undercover criminal investigation. 203 Second, he assumes that 
criminal law enforcement agencies have a monopoly on a 
specific mode of detecting violations of the law. Third, he 
assumes that a civil law enforcement agency must be given 
this monitoring authority expressly.204 
The activity of the EEOC is unlikely to exceed the bounds of 
the Fourth Amendment. Professor Yelnosky fails to consider 
that the judiciary's exertion of constitutional control and its 
imposition of a standard requiring express statutory authority 
varies with two factors: (1) the seriousness of the consequences 
for the citizen, i.e., crinilnal sanctions as compared to civil 
penalties; and (2) the degree of intrusiveness of the investiga-
tive techniques on citizens' liberty, property, and privacy.205 
202. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 462. Professor Yelnosky states that the EEOC 
lacks "traditional law enforcement powers, such as the power to conduct undercover 
operations." Id. His citation of EEOC v. First Nat'! Bank of Jackson, 614 F.2d 1004 
(5th Cir. 1980), makes it clear that by "traditional" law enforcement powers, he refers 
to agencies with criminal law investigative powers and the right to make arrests. 
203. See supra note 201. 
204. "The Commission is permitted to conduct only those investigations identified 
in the provisions of Title VII." Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 461. "Congress did not 
explicitly authorize the Commission to conduct undercover operations." Id. at 462. 
205. Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (upholding the issuance 
of a warrant for housing inspection on something less than traditional probable 
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The Fourth Amendment does place strictures on investigations 
in the civil arena, but because no liberty or incarceration 
consequences generally exist, civil authorities are given wider 
investigative scope and need not meet the stringent probable 
cause thresholds that are a pre-condition to criminal investiga-
tions. 206 The strongest controls are placed on criminal law 
enforcement agencies because they have the power to obtain 
a warrant to search and seize and to arrest-the most 
intrusive investigative techniques. In contrast, civil agencies 
such as the EEOC typically lack authority to search or to gain 
custody over a person.207 Before the activity of either a civil or 
criminal agency is deemed to be covered by the Fourth 
Amendment, it must rise to the level of a search or seizure.208 
The use of undercover agents who interact with a willing 
defendant is so remote from an intrusion of the defendant's 
privacy or property interests that courts do not consider such 
actions a search or seizure within the definition of the Fourth 
Amendment.209 Therefore, a law enforcement agency does not 
need to acquire a warrant prior to engaging in such activity 
even when it has time to secure one.210 The only controls that 
courts have placed on the use of undercover agents by law 
enforcement agencies in a purely investigative stage is a 
prohibition on entrapment. An agency cannot go beyond mere 
fact-gathering in order to deliberately induce a citizen to 
violate the law.211 Professor Yelnosky acknowledges that a 
properly controlled use of testers poses no risks of entrap-
ment.212 
Employment testing is critically different from an under-
cover operation conducted by criminal law enforcement 
cause, in part, because the "inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at 
the discovery of evidence of crime"). 
206. Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1977). 
207. One example is the Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA). 
BENJAMIN W. MINTZ, OSHA: HISTORY, LAW AND POLICY 335-529 (1984). 
208. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (holding that 
surveillance of activity in an open field is not a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, and thus requires no warrant or probable cause). 
209. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 
U.S. 293, 302 (1966). 
210. See White, 401 U.S. at 749. 
211. The Court limited the government's use of undercover agents after criminal 
· charges have ripened into adversarial proceedings, but the interests protected there 
are not privacy or property, but rather the defendant's access to counsel. See Brewer 
v .. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977). 
212. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 474-81. 
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officials. To be valid and useful, testing must be strictly obser-
vational and not-as it must be in the criminal context213-an 
interaction with a putative defendant that creates an impres-
sion that a violation of law is being invited. Civil agencies 
often engage in activity which is, in essence, identical to 
employment discrimination testing. They put staff in a place 
where they can observe directly whether the companies gov-
erned by the agency are complying with the law in the ongoing 
conduct of their business.214 
Professor Yelnosky's assumptions contravene the general 
standards that courts have developed in interpreting the 
breadth of a federal agency's investigatory authority. The 
general rule is that an agency's investigative authority ex-
tends to those techniques which are reasonable in the light of 
the enforcement tasks that the agency confronts. Where a 
specific technique is a reasonable extension of a basic statu-
tory authority to investigate, the federal agency "need not 
have specific regulatory authority for each and every one of its 
inspection and investigational procedures."215 
Professor Yelnosky's failure to recognize the relative lack of 
intrusion or burden on potential defendants in the tester 
process allows him to assume that testing must be treated 
similarly to the formal investigative process, which can ensue 
only after a charge has been filed and notice given to the 
employer.216 In fact, although the EEOC cannot coerce an em-
ployer to produce information prior to a charge being filed, 
nothing prevents the EEOC from undertaking an investigation 
such as a testing program prior to filing a charge. 
213. An investigator in the criminal context must pose as a ready cooperator in 
the violation of the criminal law in order to disguise his true identity and avoid being 
attacked. PETER L. ZIMROTH, PERVERSIONS OF JUSTICE-THE l'ROSECUTION AND AcQUflTAL 
OF THE PANTHER 21, 160-64 (1974) (describing an account of an undercover agent 
assigned to a group that police believed was plotting to bomb public facilities in New 
York City). 
214. See In re Establishment Inspection of Metro-East Mfg. Co., 655 F.2d 805, 812 
n.14 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting that OSHA inspectors are authorized to wear personal 
sampling devices while in an employer's workplace to record violations with regard 
to the toxicity in the air). 
215. In re Establishment Inspection of Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 13 F.3d 1160 
(7th Cir. 1994) (allowing videotaping by OSHA inspectors of employees in the employ-
er's workplace to gauge alleged ergonomic hazards, although regulations did not 
expressly authorize this technique). 
216. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 463. 
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All of the cases that Yelnosky cites217 to support his claim 
that the Commission cannot investigate prior to filing a charge 
actually stand for the proposition that the EEOC cannot 
obtain a contempt citation for a business's failure to turn over 
documentation until after a charge is filed.218 These cases are 
inapplicable because the EEOC would not attempt to enforce 
a contempt citation against an employer during a testing in-
vestigation. Further, the limits in these cases are not 
applicable to testing. The very essence of the technique is that 
the defendant is not coerced into giving information, but is 
merely observed in the normal course of doing business. The 
defendant controls the hiring process and voluntarily invites 
the public to participate, exposing only as much of its business 
practices as it chooses. By using the tester technique, the 
Commission merely steps into that process to observe whether 
the defendant's voluntarily initiated process observed the 
rights of applicants to nondiscriminatory treatment. 
Compared with the EEOC's formal investigatory process, 
testing is much less burdensome. All the investigative powers 
which the Commission may utilize after a charge is lodged 
could impose substantial costs on the defendant. An employer 
could be forced to produce evidence, allow inspection and 
copying of documents, and allow access to his premises, even 
against his will.219 Congress placed limitations on this part of 
the Commission's investigative powers and allows employer-
defendants to challenge Commission requests for information 
which are burdensome or irrelevant.220 An employer who is 
tested is not overwhelmed with informational demands, such 
as could occur in the more formal EEOC investigative process. 
Thus, there is no need, in terms of fairness, for notice and an 
opportunity to challenge this kind of fact gathering. The 
Commission would secure no more information about an 
217. Id. at 463 n.273. 
218. A typical statement is that made by the Court in EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 
U.S. 54 (1984). "[T]he EEOC's investigatory authority is tied to charges filed with the 
Commission; unlike other federal agencies that possess plenary authority to demand 
to see records relevant to matters within their jurisdiction .... "Id. at 64 (emphasis 
added). The EEOC is only limited in its authority to inspect or secure information by 
relying on the coercive power of a court. 
219. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1988) (right to copy documents); 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) 
(1988) (right to subpoena); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1977) (right 
to inspect). 
220. Indeed, some statutory control of this process may be constitutionally man-
dated to protect citizens from unbridled governmental intrusions and disruptions of 
business. See Marshall, 436 U.S. at 324 n.22. 
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employer's hiring process than a private person could secure 
prior to filing a charge. Finally, Professor Yelnosky's attempt 
to analogize limitations on the EEOC authority to investigate 
prior to the filing of a charge with that of the National Labor 
Relations Board221 (NLRB) is inapposite because the NLRB, 
unlike the EEOC, has no authority to initiate charges on its 
own.222 
Professor Yelnosky's contention that no provision for inves-
tigation exists prior to filing a charge ignores an important 
investigation that the EEOC does undertake before it files a 
charge. The Commission has the power to require employers 
to submit reports that are "reasonable, necessary, or appropri-
ate" for enforcement of the statute.223 The Commission collects 
reports annually from employers detailing the racial and 
gender composition of their workforce.224 The data in these 
reports can become the basis for a Commissioner's charge of 
discrimination. Moreover, courts have held that when an em-
ployer is obliged to make reports to a federal agency to show 
compliance with the statute, the agency can make non-
intrusive investigations to verify the accuracy of the 
221. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 463 n.273. 
222. Note, however, that the NLRB has ruled that employers commit an unfair 
labor practice when they refuse to hire a union staff member solely because she is 
simultaneously on the payroll of the union and organizes and acts as a watchdog 
regarding the employer's violations of the National Labor Relations Act. Three 
circuits have agreed with the Board. See Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 
1327, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Escada (USA), Inc. v. NLRB, 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2872 
(3d Cir. 1992), enforcing 304 N.L.R.B. 845 (1991); NLRB v. Henlopen Mfg. Co., 599 
F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1979) (dictum); Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224 (1992). 
Two circuits have disagreed. H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 
1989); NLRB v. Elias Bros. Big Boy, Inc., 327 F.2d 421, 427 (6th Cir. 1964). 
The noted labor scholar, William B. Gould IV (now Chairman of the NLRB) 
believes that pursuing full-time employment ought to be a practice of both unions and 
civil rights organizations: 
The recent record of"testers" ... in connection with employment discrimina-
tion litigation makes it clear that the role of such individuals is important to 
effective enforcement of the statute. Enforcement oflabor law and anti-discrimi-
nation law is promoted through the use of sophisticated full-time representa-
tives of unions or civil rights organizations, whose purpose in the employment 
relationship involves more than assuming the role of applicant or employee. 
WILi.JAM B. GoULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM-THE FU'ruRE OF EMl'LoYMENT RELATIONSHIPS 
AND THE LAW 24 (1993). 
223. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c)(3) (1988). 
224. Employers subject to Title VII with 100 or more employees are required. to 
file annual reports detailing the race and gender of employees by job classification. 
29 C.F.R. § 1602. 7 (1994). 
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employer's reports. 225 The EEOC could use testers to verify 
that an employer follows the nondiscriminatory hiring policy 
that its reports suggest. 
Professor Yelnosky acknowledges that it "may seem incon-
gruous" that the Commission has the power to initiate charges 
but lacks the power to engage in pre-charge investigations 
before doing so.226 He argues that this incongruity is resolved 
because the Commission can file charges without "reasonable 
cause" to believe a violation occurred, and can institute its 
investigation to substantiate the charge later.227 The courts 
have established a low threshold for filing a Commissioner's 
charge.228 These decisions can be supported with the specula-
tion that Congress may have sought to prevent early, and 
perhaps dilatory, challenges to the initial filing of a Commis-
sion charge. This conclusion does not mean that Congress 
thought it desirable for unsubstantiated charges to be filed or 
that the Commission should forgo easily available evidence 
before filing a charge. Congress placed limits on the Commis-
sion's formal investigatory powers to protect employers, but it 
is hardly protective of employers for the Commission to forgo 
a simple, informal monitoring technique that could preclude 
some employers from ever being charged or investigated 
further. 
Excluding the powers of discovery during litigation, private 
parties lack the range of investigatory powers that the Com-
mission possesses after a charge has been filed. Professor 
Yelnosky's reading of Title VII would mean that, despite the 
fact that the Congress gave the Commission that superior right 
of investigation, it gave the Commission less informal investiga-
tive power in the area of testing. The unreasonableness of 
Yelnosky's interpretation is further highlighted by Congress's 
action to strengthen enforcement in 1972 by authorizing the 
Commission to file charges in its own name.229 Yelnosky's 
225. Service Founding Co. v. Donovan, 721 F.2d 492, 497-98 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(holding that OSHA need not rely exclusively on employer reports designed to reveal 
compliance with air emission standards; it can verify those reports by attaching 
personal sampling devices to OSHA employees to wear for monitoring purposes). 
226. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 466. 
227. Id. 
228. See Professor Yelnosky's account of the "loosening" of constraints on Commis-
sioner's charges under the 1972 amendments. Id. at 468. 
229. See PLAYER, supra note 74, at 201-02. "Title VII was significantly amended 
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. A primary impetus for the 1972 
Amendments was a desire of civil rights advocates to provide the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) with enforcement power." Id. at 202. 
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interpretation attributes inconsistent motives and outcomes to 
Congress rather than following its explicit goals. 
Ill. THE NEED FOR ACTION BY CONGRESS 
Congressional action is not required before the EEOC can 
participate in testing for hiring discrimination. Congressional 
action may be needed, however, to enable the EEOC to coor-
dinate activity in this field and to utilize the most effective 
testing techniques. 
Te~ting conducted merely by presenting Blacks and whites 
who actually possess similar levels of education and work 
experience does not present the problems which may exist if 
testers misrepresent their education and experience. Yet it may 
prove difficult to find Blacks and whites with identical 
backgrounds, especially if the testing is done for high-level 
employment as proposed in this Article. Therefore, it might be 
desirable for the organization conducting testing to retain some 
flexibility to misrepresent the backgrounds of the testers. This 
would be an especially appropriate role for the EEOC. 
Misrepresentation of one's background in order to obtain 
employment constitutes a serious problem and is already 
illegal. 23° For example, a person who files an application for 
employment with a federal agency that includes materially 
false statements could be subjected to a criminal charge. 231 A 
·few state statutes make false statements in employment 
applications a civil or criminal breach of the law.232 A recent 
230. Senator Alan Simpson, during deliberations on the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 
considered introducing an amendment to the Act that would prohibit the EEOC from 
misrepresenting the education, experience, or other qualifications of persons used as 
testers. See supra note 117. 
231. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West Supp. 1995) makes it a crime to give false statements 
to departments or agencies of the United States government in the transaction of 
business. 
232. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 9412 (West 1988) (making it a criminal violation 
for a person seeking employment as a licensed private security guard to "make any 
false statement or material omission in any application, ... filed with the commission-
er"); Mo. REV. STAT.§ 289.060 (1986) (making any applicant for employment liable for 
fees that she would have been obligated to pay her employment agency, even though 
she has lost the employment through material misrepresentations of fact in her 
employment application); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-122.1 (1994) (making it a criminal 
violation to "make a false written representation of fact that he has received a degree 
or other certification signifying merit, achievement, or completion of an educational 
program involving study, experience, or testing from a secondary school, a 
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article noted that most state legislation does not expressly 
control all false statements in employment applications, but 
primarily prohibits submission of false or forged academic 
credentials while securing employment or obtaining admission 
to a profession or educational institution.233 Credible studies 
"estimate that between twenty and thirty percent of all working 
persons have embellished their credentials."234 That number 
represents an astoundingly high percentage of misrepresenta-
tions concerning crucial facts. More state and federal legislation 
would be appropriate not only to penalize the submission of 
false academic diplomas but also to penalize any misrepresenta-
tions in applications for employment. 
Strengthening legislation would pose minimal problems for 
a tester program. A tester program which has been as tightly 
controlled and disciplined as the one mounted by the Fair 
Employment Council would unlikely be subjected to criminal 
charges. 235 The goal of such a program is not to secure actual 
employment for the tester under false credentials: therefore, 
the conduct does not satisfy the mens rea element of the 
criminal charge as required, for example, under the federal 
law. 236 The current federal and state legislation is not expressly 
aimed at a tester situation because such legislation is designed 
to punish persons actually seeking to obtain employment or 
admission to a profession through fraudulent behavior.237 Such 
postsecondary educational institution or governmental agency in an application for: 
(a) Employment"); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-18-1 (1994) (making it a misdemeanor to 
knowingly provide an agent of an employer with any document containing false 
statements). 
233. See Joan E. Van Tol, Detecting, Deterring and Punishing the Use of Fraudulent 
Academic Credentials: A Play in Two Acts, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 791, 819-22 (1990) 
(citing 12 states which have enacted statutes that regulate the use of academic 
credentials). 
234. Id. at 794. 
235. Nevertheless, Claudia Withers, Director of the FEC, stated that her organiza-
tion employed testers only against private employers because oflegislation that made 
the submission of false credentials to public bodies unlawful. Withers Interview, supra 
note 29. 
236. United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1287-88 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that 
a false statement is insufficient to sustain a criminal conviction, for there must be 
proof of an intent to gain a material advantage on the basis of the falsity). 
237. Cf Jimerson v. Kisco Co., 542 F.2d 1008 (8th Cir. 1976). Employers may, 
naturally, discharge people who have made material misrepresentations on an 
employment application. 
The discovery of misrepresentations also may protect an employer in instances 
where a former employee makes a claim that his discharge was motivated by 
discrimination because of the so-called after-acquired evidence rule, which permits 
employers to defend a discrimination charge with evidence gathered during litigation. 
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legislation does, however, evidence a general public policy of 
discouraging deliberately constructed misstatements in the em-
ployment process. In addition to the burden on employers who 
may suffer the expense of hiring, and then firing a person who 
is unqualified-some in very sensitive positions-employers are 
forced to bear the additional costs of verifying all of an 
applicant's statements to determine whether the applicant 
submitted a false application. Although a tester program using 
fabricated credentials would not ultimately violate the legi-
slation prohibiting misrepresentations in the employment 
application process, strong public policy reasons argue for 
limitations on the individuals who would be allowed to resort 
to the technique. 238 If any need exists for Congressional 
attention to the tester process, it would be in this discrete 
arena.239 Arguably, either the EEOC should be the only entity 
allowed to arm its staff with false credentials, or other organi-
zations should be required to obtain approval from the EEOC. 
Because the employment testing process is much more compli-
cated than testing in the housing arena, Congress should 
consider funding the EEOC to provide training and guidance 
to private organizations. 
The circuits disagree, however, whether such after-acquired evidence operates as a 
total or partial defense. See Ann C. McGinley, Reinventing Reality: The Impermissible 
Intrusion of After-acquired Evidence in Title VII Litigation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 145, 
159-71 (1993). The Supreme Court recently resolved that disagreement when it 
determined that after-acquired evidence of a former employee's wrongdoing can bar 
reinstatement, but does not bar all recovery. McKennon v. Nashvill_!! Banner Pubishing 
Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 885-86 (1995). 
238. Arguments that state legislation which prohibits misrepresentations in the 
employment application process were preempted would probably fail. Where Congress 
has not expressly preempted state legislation, the courts are less likely to find 
preemption where the state has strong public policy reasons for a right to continued 
control over the subject matter. See Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Jointers, 
430 U.S. 290 (1977). In any event, the preemption argument would not be applicable 
to the federal legislation that also prohibits falsification of credentials in the applica-
tion process. The courts are likely to read the two pieces of legislation together to see 
if both can survive. In that event, the courts likely would find that Title VII permits 
testing, but that it cannot be done by a misrepresentation of credentials where it is 
unlawful under state or federal law. 
239. Congress should take action on only one other matter: it should clarify that 
an organization like the Fair Employment Council could be structured solely to prepare 
and process testers and still retain standing to sue. See supra notes 42-64 and 
accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
Discrimination on the grounds ofrace, ethnicity, gender, and 
age are still widespread in our society. It is not surprising that 
stereotypes and the habits they foster have lingered. Dis-
crimination in employment was made illegal by federal statute 
approximately thirty years ago, but discrimination on the basis 
of sex or race has been an active phenomenon since the 
founding of our nation. 
It is a sign of progress that those who practice such 
discrimination now must do so covertly. The change in the char-
acter of discrimination calls for new techniques to fight it. 
Using testers in the employment field is one of those techn-
iques, and it is heartening that the courts that have dealt with 
this new approach have been receptive. If the major litigator 
against employment discrimination-the EEOC-began to uti-
lize the new approach, the technique could present a real 
impetus to the employer community to change its practices or 
to monitor its hiring process more closely. This powerful tool 
is legitimately within the present arsenal of the EEOC. The 
only legislative attention that is needed is control over the 
presentation of credentials to targeted employers. 

